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SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE BRIGADE REVIEW // JUNE 2012 // ISSUE IV

STARS JUNE 2012 NFORMER SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE BRIGADE REVIEW





"ONE TEAM, ONE MISSION"





STARS INFORMER

JUNE 2012 - ISSUE 4 www.seebrig.org

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Stars Informer: Review is the authorized unofficial publication of SEEBRIG HQ.

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SEEBRIG Commander Brigadier General Zdravko POPOVSKI (Na-5)

Foreword



Dear readers,

Allow me first to congratulate those who made this happen and at the same time express my sincere gratitude to the host nation and present admirations to my predecessor BG Zyber DUSHKU and convey recognitions to the integral SEEBRIG HQ on their achievements. Here in the hart of Thessaly, backed by the patron of Saint Achillius of Larissa, and the good wind coming from Mount Olympus, via the Pineios River and the Ancient Agora, I feel honoured and privileged to take-over the responsibilities as the commander of SEEBRIG.

For me this is a more then just a career achievement; it is a momentum which needs prudent approach to thinking about the future. I personally am proud to be in Larissa today, the World Capital of Poetry in 2011, where the 22nd World Congress of Poets took place. Larissa brought together poets from all around the world to promote «World Brotherhood and Peace through Poetry» not discriminating race, religion and nationality. SEEBRIG has the very same role in military terms, to bring multiculturalism, as some of my predecessors have said, and enhance multinational friendship and contemporary political and military cooperation of the region. I am here to serve that goal. In this modern dynamic and vibrant city, the capabilities and readiness should not be based on previous assumptions, on the contrary, they should be derived from our abilities to take steps now, which will help us understand and plan for the future.

Since SEEBRIG is operationally ready, this is a time to concentrate on essentials. SEEBRIG is in a position to advance the already successful achievements as a part of a security policy and regional cooperation. SEEBRIG is an evolutionary regional military tool that relies on deployable, sustainable, and interoperable forces. It could create the common response to the challenges based on a modern understanding of warfare. SEEBRIG can play a role in advocating security and best practices in a unique position to build partnership in support of the common goals and to help decision-makers identify the best course of action.

I believe in the evolution and future of SEEBRIG as of global security commons. I am convinced that being in command with SEEBRIG will definitely contribute to building an effective military cooperation and create a spirit of trust among our respective militaries. At the end, it will define a military structure capable of assuring that peace and stability will always prevail.

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COMSEEBRIG Commander Brigadier General Zdravko POPOVSKI (Na-5)

Pyramid Relationship

"I know that you believe you understand what you think I said, but I am not sure you realize that what you heard is not what I meant."

- Robert McCloskey



It is not always easy to understand group dynamics when you live in another culture and not understand all what is going on around you. Interpersonal sensitivity and adaptability are two key factors in being successful in forming healthy relationships and developing good group dynamics in your new community and/or workplace.

I remember at university my anthropology and andragogy professor was lecturing on groups and communities and he explained to us in class that in effect interpersonal relationships are no different from intercultural relations. He was basically saying that all contact with others is intercultural and calls for interpersonal skills that are at the same tame cross-cultural. If you stop and think about it, this is so true, even twins riding in the same stroller see different things.

A friend of mine recently shared with me about how she regrets not having known the widow who lived in the apartment opposite her apartment. Her widow neighbor



of 60 one morning overdosed on some pills. The widow had stood on her balcony before this happened and had waved at the janitor sweeping the front sidewalk down below. The police found a note on her desk: "I can not bear any more day of being lonely. Nobody calls me. Nobody visit me. I feel nobody cares". Trying to console my friend, I reminded her that not everyone wears their heart on their sleeve. Some people hide their filings and you can not have any way of knowing they are lonely.

A letter came from an expat, who wrote that she is an international human resources management position for a company abroad. She wrote the following:

I would like to develop better interpersonal relations with my work colleagues but I am unsure how to go about doing this. When you live in a different culture, sometimes it can be hard to know. Boundaries may vary....

Anybody who has worked cross-culturally or within international environment understands the challenge that we faced. Also, those who have moved to another culture to live and work, or who have married someone of different nationality, face similar challenges in understanding group dynamics and building personal relationships. In order to live and work successfully cross-culturally, it helps to be "interculturally competent". That means you need to be able to "effectively communicate with people who are from different national, organizational, functional, and professional cultures than-your-own. Intercultural communication studies confirm that, in order to communicate, two persons or two groups of different cultures must interact so as to develop a common pool of values, renegotiation of their own identities.

Bronislaw Malinowsi is considered a forerunner of cultural anthropology and developed a model known as the Interpersonal Pyramid' His work takes into consideration human and historical aspects in society, and suggest a psychological trait to cultural facts. The interpersonal Pyramid consists of five levels: Satisfaction, Trust, Disclosure, Acceptance and Apprentice.

Necessitate for **Satisfaction** forms the foundation for interpersonal relations. As you build **Trust**, the other person will intentionally shared his need and accept help. Each of Malinowski's levels are successive steps and can be difficult to develop and can be easily reversed. **Disclosure** deals with making ourselves known to another person significant to us. In a work situation there is a real risk of personal damage and should be practiced indecorously. **Acceptance** is something we all want; however, each culture defines how this will be communicated and established. For example, the North American shakes hands with the one he respects and accepts. The Filipino holds hands with the one whom he accepts. The final step, **Apprenticeship** is the peak of the Interpersonal Pyramid. This level is the

point of encouraging one another to grow in being the best we can be.

I would like to close with these three simple tips from David M. Nour in his article "the Importance of Relationships Within the Core Group". He suggests: 'Leading people is not telling them what to do; it is about understanding how they fit into the work environment and can be understood within the context. Do not just listen; also hear what is said. Strive to understand others' points of view."



Chief of Staff
Colonel Ioannis CHATZIDIMOS (Na-3)

Preserving Tradition, Expanding Capabilities

Last year witnessed numerous turbulent events proving that word peace and stability remains an elusive goal. In addition large scale natural/environmental disasters lurk threatening the very life and welfare of every day people. In such a context regional organizations like SEDM and especially the existence of peace support forces like SEEBRIG gain special importance. All these years the latter has acquired significant experience and gathered expert personnel on PSOs that persistently sought to increase Brigade's capabilities. Is a tradition worthwhile to preserve.

Since its inception SEEBRIG constitutes something unique for our region. Actually the significance of this great formation is dual-faceted. Firstly SEEBRIG attests that region's nations stand ready and resolute to contribute to the noble cause of international community to preserve world peace and stability. Secondly SEEGRIG is the concrete proof that region's personnel can be brought together and cooperate harmoniously and efficiently, achieving perfect results. SEEBRIG personnel, from the very beginning of this endeavor, have totally understood its importance and have worked together intensively and effectively to create and maintain a military formation capable to be deployed timely and efficiently in order to preserve safe and secure environment wherever and whenever peace is at risk.



Last year's biggest event was SEEBRIG relocation. Between 21 and 27 June 2011, following four pleasant and constructive years in Istanbul, Brigade's HQ was moved to Larissa. The relocation of its HQ is definitely the most demanding task of SEEBRIG during peace time. The transfer plan was professionally drafted and executed and

the entire of equipment reached its destination without delays or damages. Similarly the staff officers and their dependents were relocated as smoothly as possible. Yet there were a lot of details and minor problems that had to be solved in order the process to be finalized. Therefore, until the end of the previous year, a part of efforts were allocated to this task. In that context the support provided by 1st Hellenic Army was invaluable.



Another momentous event during the previous year was the Handover/Takeover Ceremony of PMSC/SEDM-CC Chairmanship and SEEBRIG Commandership on 14 July 2011. The Chairperson of SEDM-CC & PMSC, HE Mrs. Avgustina TZVETKOVA (Na 2) handed over the Chairmanship of SEDM-CC&PMSC to HE Mr. Giuseppe COSIGA (Na 4) and Brig. Gen. Zyber DUSHKU (Na 1) handed over the command of SEEBRIG to Brig. Gen. Zdravko POPOVSKI (Na 5). The presence of political and high military ranking representatives from SEDM and MPFSEE countries, NATO and other international organizations as well as host nation civil high ranking officials and other distinguished guests underlined the magnitude of the event.

Following 26th PMSC meeting on 13th-14th September in Rome and SEDM Meeting in Antalya on 3rd October 2011, the HQ undertook two major tasks. Firstly to prepare a working analysis concerning the future location of SEEBRIG HQ by exploring pros and cons as well as critical issues of the two possible options (permanent site or continuation of relocation) and secondly to draft a study on possible development of mentoring and training roles and skills for both the Brigade and its Headquarters tak-



ing into account existing financial constraints. In order to carry out the first task, the HQ established a relevant working group under the coordination of COMSEE-BRIG.

This working group examined meticulously the issue and prepared a detailed analysis. The latter, included also a matrix in an effort to provide an analytical tool able to evaluate the military aspect of the subject and following a meeting in Tyrnavos, in January 2012, encompassed also the nations' opinions. As regards the second task another working group was formed in order to determine SEE-BRIG's capacity to undertake the mission of training and /or mentoring other military units up to the level of brigade. The study concluded that although this mission is brand new for the Brigade, the latter stands ready to carry out such a task. However, depending on the mission, a period of prior training for Brigade's personnel might be needed. Nevertheless, as the study underlines "SEEBRIG remains eager and motivated for this new challenge which will open new perspectives for the brigade and enrich its capabilities."

Remaining absolutely devoted to the goal of continuously increasing its personnel capabilities and knowledge, SEE-BRIG, in November 2011 organized a PSO seminar in its HQ with the assistance of Na 3 Multinational Peace Support Operations Training Center (MPSOTC). The seminar was conducted by a number of MPSOTC instructors and provided updates upon many PSO topics.



Being new in Na 3 and in particular in Larissa, another concern of the HQ has been the improvement of SEE-BRIG visibility to local authorities and population as well as the establishment of close relation with various national and NATO military HQ and units. To that end HQ received visits from CAOC 7 DCOM MG Mark Graper and from 1st Hellenic Army COM LTG Konstantinos Ginis. At the same time COM SEEBRIG accompanied by COS and SNRs paid official visits to 1st Hellenic Army HQ, an Na 3 Air Force HQ, and the Mayors of Tyrnavos and Larissa.



Visits to SEEBRIG HQ



SEEBRIG's first study trip in Na 3 took place in late October 2011. HQ personnel and their families had the opportunity to learn a lot about ancient Greek history and civilization by visiting some of the most important archeological sites like Delphi and Athens' Acropolis as well as significant museums like Acropolis and Athens Archeological Museum. In addition, COM SEEBRIG accompanied by the entire nucleus staff paid official visits to National Defense General Staff (NDGS) and Hellenic Army General Staff (HAGS).



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Another major activity was the evaluation visits to nations' units allocated to SEEBRIG.















The bulk of them were completed until May 2012. The HQ gave a lot of importance to these evaluations in order to figure out the real capabilities of the units and their ability to meet the requirements of such challenging operations as PSOs. Eventually, the process made obvious that all units consist of highly professional personnel, are appropriate equipped and ready to undertake and accomplish successfully any mission assigned to them.

It is with great pleasure to realize that all nations do their upmost in order to maintain and provide SEEBRIG with such mission-ready units.

Nonetheless the center of gravity for 2012 is the preparation and eventually the execution of SEESIM 12 and SEV-EN STARS 12. Apart from participating in or organizing planning conferences for the two exercises a well-planed schedule of BSTs aims to prepare personnel (especially newcomers) for the efficient completion of both exercises.



Lessons learned and experience from previous exercises are being taken into consideration while any updates on PSO and RDO are being analyzed. I am confided that every one of us is going to do his/her best in order to meet the exercises' requirements. In addition we are planning to call several IOs and NGOs because understanding each other's mentality and way of working is the very basic but at the same time crucial towards the accomplishment of most wanted comprehensive approach during PSOs.

Last but not least, during the first half of 2012, the HQ continued its efforts to increase SEEBRIG's visibility not only within host nation but also amongst all contributing nation. Our first step was to improve SEEBRIG's web page. Nowadays, because of the wide use of internet, we deem that our web page is a powerful tool for enhancing visibility. Therefore it was restructured to be more attention-grabbing and able to provide easily more information without tiring the reader. Apart from web page the HQ came up with a novel insightful idea; to send delegations to the nation's military academic institutions to deliver presentations about SEEBRIG's role and importance. The initiative was embraced immediately by the nations and until now we have visited several military colleges.

Our goals for the rest of 2012 includes the effort to optimize Brigade's internal procedures and functions by improving SOPs, to seek ways to upgrade our CIS and C2 equipment and of course to increase our personnel capabilities and knowledge.



As I mentioned in the beginning, all these years SEE-BRIG personnel have made their own tradition, a tradition that every one of us appreciate and respect. So allow me, speaking on behalf of all of present nucleus staff, to express my deepest appreciation and gratitude to the previous colleagues for their excellent work that has created this tradition. I would like also to ensure everyone that each Officer and NCO is wholeheartedly willing to carry on this great tradition. As the new COS I have realized from my early days in the Brigade that I have the honor to lead a team of very capable and highly motivated and professional colleagues. Our common task remains to continuously improve our means and capabilities. By doing so: "SEEBRIG will stay as a valuable tool of international military cooperation in the region and beyond, having the capabilities and readiness to perform its duties at the highest standards".



Deputy Chief Of Staff - Operations Colonel Özgür TÖR (Na-7)

■ A Historical Approach to Peacekeeping Operations and Protection of Civilians

Peacekeeping was primarily limited to maintaining ceasefires and stabilizing the situation on the ground, providing crucial support for political efforts to resolve conflicts by peaceful means. Those missions consisted of unarmed military observers and lightly armed troops with primarily monitoring, reporting and confidence-building roles.

Peacekeeping began in 1948 when the Security Council authorized the deployment of UN military observers to the Middle East. The mission's role was to monitor the Armistice Agreement between Israel and its Arab neighbors – an operation which became known as the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO).

Over the years, as of 31 January 2012, there were almost 121,000 personnel serving on 16 peace operations led by the UN Department of Peace¬keeping Operations (DPKO) on four continents directly impacting the lives of hundreds of millions of people. This represents a nine-fold increase in UN peacekeepers since 1999. In addition, the Department of Field Support (DFS) – which provides support and expertise in the areas of personnel, finance and budget, communications, information technology, and logistics – supports another 15 special political and/or peace building field mis¬sions managed by the Department of Political Affairs, as well as a number of other UN peace offices requiring administrative and logistical assistance from UN Headquarters.

The UN does not have its own military force - it depends on contributions from Member States. As of 31 January 2012, 115 countries contributed military and police personnel to UN peacekeeping. More than 84,000 of those serving were troops and military observers and about 14,500 were police personnel. In addition, there were more than 5,500 international civilian personnel, nearly 12,500 local civilian staff and some 2,300 UN Volunteers from over 160 nations serving under the UN flag.

In 1988, UN peacekeepers were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. At that time, the Nobel Committee cited "the Peacekeeping Forces through their efforts have made important contributions towards the realization of one of the fundamental tenets of the United Nations. Thus, the world organization has come to play a more central part in world affairs and has been invested with increasing trust". But in the conflicts in Rwanda (1994) and Srebrenica/Bosnia (1995), UN Peacekeepers stood by helplessly, which led to increasing calls for robust peacekeeping for the protection of civilians in armed conflicts. Those events are turning points for protection of civilians and the International Commission on Intervention and state Sovereignty set up. This Commission published its report, The Responsibility to Protect, in December 2001.

Therefore, when it comes to understanding peacekeeping the stakes are very high indeed. Done well, peace operations can protect civilians from harm, facilitate the implementation of peace agreements and significantly improve the chances of long-term peace. But there is considerable room for improvement. Failures, abuses and crimes hurt people, undermine the legitimacy of peace operations and reduce the likelihood of stable peace.

Here are the some types of examples of violations and deprivations that cause protection needs:

- Deliberate killing, wounding, displacement, destitution and disappearance;
- Sexual violence and rape;
- Torture and inhuman or degrading treatment;
- Dispossession of assets by theft and destruction;
- The misappropriation of land and violations of land rights;
- Deliberate discrimination and deprivation of health, education, property rights, access to water and economic opportunity;
- Violence and exploitation within the affected community;
- Forced or accidental family separation;
- Arbitrary restrictions of free movement, including forced return, punitive curfews or roadblocks which prevent access to fields, markets, jobs, family, friends, and social services;



- Thirst, hunger, disease and repeat health crises caused by the deliberate destruction of services or the denial of association and religious freedom;
- The loss or theft of personal documentation that gives proof of identity, ownership and citizen's rights;
- Attacks against civilians and the spreading of landmines.

As the number of operations continues to grow, they become more complex in terms of both the actors who conduct and authorize them and the task they perform. The sides that have problem themselves can fight each other but the peacekeeping forces must take precautions. They can't say or produce any kind of excuse for being incapable of protecting civilians. For this reason, they must have good planning and the commander has to be mainly concerned about the deployment of military units to areas in need of them. Categories of protection threats could be classified in three areas:

- Must protect areas;
- Should protect areas;
- Could protect areas.

Any successful military operation begins with planning. Failure to integrate environmental considerations into operational and tactical level planning increases the risk to the health and safety of military personnel and of civilians. Even inadvertent damage to the civilians or to significant cultural or historic resources also complicates the attainment of the desired strategic end state through the loss of political capital, negative public image, and increased overall cost.

Military operations present unique challenges that are not typically associated with peacetime domestic routines or training activities. Although operational requirements are paramount, the integration of the protection of civilians into all aspects of operational planning, training, and execution is essential for maintaining the health and wellbeing of the deployed troops and of the local population. In addition, early environmental planning and continuous risk management is critical for preventing irreparable damage to sites with natural, cultural, and historic significance which degrade or complicate the overall achievement of mission objectives.

The commanders of the units are ultimately responsible for the integration of environmental considerations during the training and planning for a military mission, and during the conduct of operations within their area of responsibility (AOR). They must demonstrate leadership and promote environmental awareness, the protection of civilians throughout their chain of command during the execution of the mission.

Commanders must also ensure that the forces under their command receive the appropriate levels of intelligence as well as environmental awareness and technical training. This involves the identification and assignment of clear responsibilities and resources to provide effective and proactive civilians' protection management. For good civilians' protection management unit commanders and their personnel must:

- Know and understand the mission objectives;
- Work effectively within the established chain-of-command;
- Understand all applicable legal and policy requirements;
- Be familiar with the local people;
- Study prior lessons learned;
- Lead civilian protection planning for mission sustainability;
- Establish and implement a civilians' protection management plan.

Force Commanders and unit leaders should therefore be aware of all applicable policies, and should define the policy requirements through a memorandum of intent, published Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), or other similar directives. Consideration should be given to troop contributing nation (TCN) requirements, multilateral or coalition policy, or force-specific directives. References to all relevant policy should be included in the Operations Plan (OPLAN).

In conclusion, the legal responsibility to protect civilians can be defined by the rules of existing doctrine relating to the protection of civilians. While such a legal responsibility to protect civilians is furthering the agenda of conflict prevention, the merge of the two concepts appears to cause operational and ethical dilemmas.



Deputy Chief Of Staff - Support Colonel Lucian MAFTEI (Na-6)

New Challenges in a Multinational Brigade with 12 Years of History

I am the newest member of SEEBRIG HQ Nucleus Staff or, as it is very often called, SEEBRIG family. Due to some financial constrains faced, I presume, by every Member Nation (MN) of the Multinational Peace Force South-Eastern Europe (MPFSEE), my arrival to the new HQ SEEBRIG location was postponed several months. Nevertheless, at the very beginning of this year, in January, I presented my official documents to SEEBRIG Commander (COMSEEBRIG) regarding my appointment as Deputy Chief of Staff Support (DCOSSUP) and I was welcomed by the Command Group as well as by all members of SEEBRIG family.

I have to admit that SEEBRIG as an organization is not something totally new for me. I first learned about SEE-BRIG matters at the beginning of 2002 when I was earmarked for Nation 6 (Na-6) Host Nation Office for Primary Responsibilities (HNOPR) during the second HQ SEEBRIG rotation which was in Constanța (between 2003 and 2007). I was appointed to that position for two years (2002 to 2004) and I remember that during that time, studying the Agreement, its Anexes and Protocols I've noticed DCOSSUP position granted to my nation for the period of 2011 to 2013, in Na-3, and I was joking with my colleagues: *See this position? It's mine!* Now, I can tell you: from time to time, dreams come true.

I kept the HNOPR position mentioned above till the end of 2004, just after the evaluation process of SEEBRIG was finalized and the Full Operational Capability (FOC) was achieved. Since then I have always been in contact with SEEBRIG matters, not only by visiting the web page of the organization, but also through direct dialogue with some of my friends who used to work as Na-6 officers or NCOs in HQ SEEBRIG. So, in one way or another, I was aware about the SEEBRIG life and actual status.

But the real world of HQ SEEBRIG it was to be found only here, on the spot. All the important topics on the current agenda of HQ SEEBRIG could be considered as new challenges for our organization. It's difficult to establish a sort of hierarchy among these new challenges, so I will give some details about them as they come into my attention.

The Agreement on the Multinational Peace Force South-Eastern Europe establishes the Multinational Peace Force South-Eastern Europe (MPFSEE) at brigade level/South-Eastern Europe Brigade (SEEBRIG) which will be declared to UN and to OSCE. SEEBRIG "will be available, commensurate with its capabilities, for employment in conflict prevention and in other peace support operations, including peace-keeping, peace-making, peace-building and humanitarian operations". This is to be considered the main mission of SEEBRIG. All activities of SEEBRIG are conducted in the idea of preparing and improving its capabilities in order to be ready to be employed in one of the above operations. For this reason, the latest request of Politico-Military Steering Committee (PMSC) to analyze the possibility for SEEBRIG to perform Training and Mentoring activities for other organizations was seen as a possible future mission for us.

In this respect, we approached the subject very seriously and conducted a study and a detailed analysis in which almost all of us were involved, not only our colleagues from the operations branch. Finally we suggested to PMSC a series of possibilities for SEEBRIG involvement in Training and Mentoring activities such as: the trainees to be trained in the SEEBRIG HQ; to deploy all SEEBRIG with all allocated units; a Task Group/Force, especially SEEBRIG with some of allocated units to be deployed; only SEEBRIG HQ (Contingency Establishment - CE) supported by HQ COY and SIG COY or only Nucleus Staff (Peace Establishment - PE) supported by a mission tailored HQ COY and SIG COY to be deployed. I'm sure that my colleagues from the operations branch will provide more details about these possible ways to employ SEEBRIG in Training and Mentoring activities in their contribution to this magazine.

Another area of future challenges and concerns for SEE-BRIG is the status of SEEBRIG HQ. As is stated in the basic MPFSEE Agreement, the HQ SEEBRIG is a rotational one, once in four years, and the rotational period ends in 2015 in current location, Tyrnavos, Larissa, Na-3. Due to this important aspect as well as the declared intention of Na-2 (Bulgaria) and Na-7 (Turkey) to permanently host our HQ after 2015, Southeastern Europe Defence



Ministerial (SEDM) and PMSC tasked COMSEEBRIG to analyze the topic. As a consequence to the above mentioned facts, at SEEBRIG HQ level an internal Working Group was established in order to conduct a study and analyze both options. We adapted and used the specific steps of Operational Planning Process to the given task and produced an evaluation matrix in order to have a correct identification and evaluation of factors that can lead to a proper choice between the options for permanent or rotational HQ considered as Courses of Action (COA). The evaluated factors were identified in the areas of operations, logistics, financial, public relations and other general issues. Using the tool of the comparison matrix in order to assess the given options (COA1 PERMANENT HQ, COA2 ROTATIONAL HQ) under a military perspective, SEEBRIG Staff and Member Nations representatives considered the COA1 as the recommended one. Nevertheless COA 2 remains a valid option due to its specific characteristics and may still be taken into consideration. We consider that any option may still be taken into consideration at SEDM and ministerial level if there will be further reasons and/or criteria which are beyond the scope and level of SEEBRIG HQ analysis.

In any organization, including the military, the concern for optimization and efficiency is a priority for the Command Group. The last year's experience, during the relocation of SEEBRIG HQ from Istanbul, Na-7, to Larissa, Na-3, reveals an inappropriate use of the experience gained by our personnel during their mandate in SEEBRIG and an expensive and uncomfortable double transfer issue. This fact leads us to the necessity to reconsider the personnel rotation policy in SEEBRIG HQ. The structure of positions is established by the basic MPFSEE Agreement. Based on this, we have multinational rotational positions, which are rotated on a two year basis according to the Agreement, Host Nation positions which are rotated in up to four years depending on the Host Nation policy, bilateral positions which are rotated in up to two years depending on the bilateral agreements among nations, and national positions for which the tour of duty depends on the national policy and can be up to four years.

Taking into account the structure of the positions and the specific activities in every four years cycle, when relocation of SEEBRIG HQ takes place, we identified a series of repetitive problems faced by our personnel and created by the present rotation policy. Due to the relocation of SEEBRIG HQ every four years, the incumbent Nucleus Staff personnel moves with the HQ in the new location approximately in June and is replaced by newcomers in July/ September, just to stay in the new place for a few weeks/ months. These series of repetitive problems happen three times each twelve years in the ongoing rotation system, instead of only one time after every twelve years in case of the three years personnel rotation. The three years man-

date for all SEEBRIG personal is considered as a necessity due to the fact that at every rotation our organization lacks specialized and experienced personnel, especially in key positions, in a very important and sensitive period of time: closing all activities and administrative issues in the old location and establish a functional HQ in the new location in a very short period of time. On the other hand, our personnel will have the same rotation status as in other international organizations (UN, EU, OSCE, NATO).

It is worth to be emphasized that all these issues were presented at the PMSC Meeting in Rome (in March 2012) and they will be subject of further decisions.

The above three major topics are SEEBRIG's concerns for the near future and they are only a few of all challenging aspects that are in our attention. To finalize any of them a high degree of support is needed and here is the area where the Support Branch of SEEBRIG HQ to be involved. The Support concept in our organization is described in the basic MPFSEE Agreement and was correlated with the military operations in which SEEBRIG have participated after its establishment. This concept has become known and has been applied along with the first participations of various SEEBRIG's military elements/ structures to multinational activities and exercises, and subsequently to SEEBRIG deployment to Afghanistan in 2006, where conflict resolution required the presence and specific actions of military forces.

The Support Branch, by participating in activities which required cooperation, under multiple aspects and in various circumstances, with military components of other states since the very beginning of MPFSEE activity, was one of the branches which has been a major contributor to the success of our organization. All officers and NCOs of the Support Branch have a good experience in their field of expertise which comes from an effective and active presence in a series of exercises, activities and operations within an international framework, both in their countries and abroad. For this reason I strongly believe that they will do their best to face the all the new challenges in a very professional way and with very good results.



Political Adviser of COMSEEBRIG As. Prof. Phd. Kujtim HASANI (Na-1)

South-Eastern Europe Defense Ministerial Process (A Success Story of Regional Cooperation)



History

The radical changes in Europe's security environment in the 90's have posed a challenge for the international community in general and for South-Eastern Europe in particular. Due to the post-Cold War conflicts and tensions in the Balkans, the nations of the region recognized the need for political, economic, social, legal and defense reform buttressing the quest for a long lasting peace.

Having in mind the basic conclusions in the Declarations made by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Sofia, Thessaloniki and Istanbul for good neighborly relations, stability, security and co-operation in South Eastern Europe as well as the Crete Declaration, the United States proposed a meeting of six Defense Ministers of NATO and Partnerships for Peace (PfP) nations in Tirana in March 1996 to begin the individual, national, and regional defensemilitary cooperation, transparency, confidence-building, and interoperability crucial to achieving security. This was the first in a series of meetings that brought together the Ministers of Defense, Deputy Ministers of Defense and Deputy Chiefs of Defense of the nations of South-Eastern Europe.




Today, after 16 years, the South-Eastern Europe Defense Ministerial (SEDM) process is an informal association of Defense Ministers of nine NATO members and five PfP nations. As an informal association of Defense Ministers, SEDM has no founding document. However, an agreement signed in Thessaloniki, Greece, on 9 October 2000 established a Coordination Committee (SEDM-CC) to deal with all SEDM's rapidly multiplying activities except the MPFSEE/SEEBRIG, which has its own Political – Military Steering Committee (PMSC).

SEDM participants have collectively undertaken a number of practical and cooperative initiatives organized around annual meetings. The ways that are being used by SEDM to promote the practical projects include: meetings, workshops, seminars, projects, working groups, High Level Working Groups and Experts' Groups. The most significant achievement of SEDM has been the establishment of the South-East Europe Brigade (SEEBRIG), by the Agreement signed in Skopje on 26 September 1998.

In addition to SEEBRIG some major SEDM projects have been and are currently implemented as follows:

- Interconnection of Military Hospitals (IMIHO);
- Defense/Military Support to WMD Counter proliferation, Border Security, and Counterterrorism(CBSC);
- The South-Eastern Europe Simulation Network (SEESIM);
- South-Eastern Europe Defense Industry, Research and Technology (SEEDIRET);
- Civil-Military Emergency Planning South-Eastern Europe (CMEPSEE);
- Female Leadership in Security and Defense Conference (FLSD);
- Building Integrity Initiative (BII).





Today, we have a different situation: SEESIM, IMIHO, FLSD are continuing, while Building Integrity Initiative (BII) is undergoing the agreement procedures. Among all the projects there is no doubt that SEEBRIG plays the most significant role as an operational branch of SEDM.

Lesson Learned

SEDM as an expression of political-military will is a regional initiative constituting one of the main political factors for peace, stability, and cooperation between the nations of South Eastern Europe. SEEBRIG as the main military project of SEDM is surely contributing to the security and stability not only on a regional scale but also worldwide when needed.

SEDM process has been conducting its activities combining two criteria: first, protecting national and regional's interests, and second, serving to promote democracy, prosperity, human rights, economic development and freedom. There is no doubt that acting within the International Organizations System (UN, EU, OSCE and NATO), the countries of South-Eastern Europe made significant progress in achieving these outcomes.

The need for cooperation in the region is obvious. Nations share concerns about many problems and issues for which coordinated efforts could be mutually beneficial. Basically a continuing dialogue among nations in this region that hope to work on common approaches to common concerns by cooperating on multinational initiatives complements the enormous amount of bilateral diplomacy that our government officials conduct every day to promote and

protect their nations' interests and priorities. The history of the last 16 years has shown that South-Eastern Europe is more peaceful and stable and that problems are solved based on multilateral and bilateral meetings and international law.

SEDM as a multinational process is one of the many foreign policy tools in the diplomatic relations - admittedly a very important one. For SEDM, regional cooperation faces its greatest challenge of other International Organizations because this process plays a significant role in the integration within the Euro-Atlantic security system, sharing the common values of the democratic society and building relations among the countries.

The recent NATO enlargement has undoubtedly contributed to stabilizing the region of South-Eastern Europe, and has created a positive impact on regional cooperation. "Considering their commitment to contribute to regional security and stability and to foster good neighborly relations among the countries in South-Eastern Europe in the context of the South-Eastern Europe Defense Ministerial (SEDM) process, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and in the spirit of Partnership for Peace (PfP)..." has been a cornerstone for the actions of the region's countries. In this context, it has been a source of deep satisfaction for Defense Ministers that SEDM Process has already acted as platform which facilitated the membership of Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia and Albania to NATO.

These achievements carry a message that nations of South-Eastern Europe have both the political will and the capability to promote regional cooperation in order to achieve long lasting peace, security and stability. All activities that are undertaken within the context of SEDM process have improved the regional security due to accomplishment of three goals: promoting regional cooperation and good neighborly relation; strengthening regional defense capabilities as well as cooperation through collective efforts, and establishment of links facilitating integration into the Euro-Atlantic institutions.

Countries committed in a "Coalition of the Willing" based on individual decisions and preferences make up a coalition for a purpose participating in and/or providing political and other types of support to particular operations. In this way the countries have a flexible platform that enables them to collaborate more closely to peace keeping operations, disaster relief operations, counter terrorism, counter proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, fighting human trafficking, international crime, and other threats. Being part of a "Coalition of the Willing" member nations avoid working with partners that will hamper the mission or the coalition, downgrade initial goals, and constantly reopen negotiations.



Broader institutionalized regional cooperation has its own constraints, but when states play by the rules it allows for easier compromise through what was called "diffused reciprocity," because members "expect to benefit in the long run and over many issues, rather than every time on every issue".

SEDM process has applied an "open door" policy for members from countries of the region. The history of SEDM has shown that requirements for membership in this process demonstrated commitment to freedom at home and abroad, a willingness and readiness to take immediate action in the face of a threat, and an ability to contribute meaningfully to "Coalition of the Willing" activities. Actually, we have 14 member countries and 2 observers in SEDM process and 7 member countries and 4 observers in SEEBRIG. This process is continuing and we hope that soon SEDM and SEEBRIG will have new members or observers. The accession of new countries is proof of this Process' viability.

Members of SEDM Process as a regional cooperation mechanism believe that security and liberty are inextricably linked and that broader multilateral security cooperation is necessary. The options for closer cooperation include better-integrated law enforcement, joint military training and exercises, civil-military emergency planning, personnel management, border security etc., and the success of the common projects proved that multilateral coordination is not only possible but is also a productive option. The Smart Process Concept is the essence of such kind of activities.

Smart Process Concept focuses on using the best options to achieve the best results. The more options available, the better, especially when close cooperation with other International Organizations such as UN, EU, OSCE, and NATO produces effective results. Member Nations have focused their efforts to create additional alternative projects and programs through which they can improve their capabilities or solve the problems through a more direct approach.

The SEDM Process is a significant instrument through which participating nations generate security. Multilateral and regional initiatives increase the cultural, political, and military cooperation between member countries, agree on decisions with mutual benefits and profit from these decisions. Basing of projects in different nations has enhanced mutual understanding and has built confidence between nations and individuals. Hosting of meetings in different countries has given the chance to the representatives from Armed Forces of member nations to work in a multinational environment. The personnel involved in such kind of activities and their political leaders are getting more familiar to each nation's culture and finally achieve the unity in both spirit and objectives. In other words, it is a good

exercise in our attempt to live by the motto "One team, one mission".

Way Ahead

After 16 successful years SEDM Process has to adapt its philosophy, strategic objectives and manner of cooperation with other International Organizations. Representatives from the member nations in SEDM are working to analyze this process and we have acquired sufficient experience and skills since 1996. In order to enhance this process to become a more fruitful regional cooperation initiative there is a need to hold the right balance between regional interest and Euro-Atlantic strategy, between regional interest and possibilities to contribute beyond the region and to avoiding overlapping of the projects with other International Organizations. This strategic review has to follow those conducted by other International Organizations and it must really lead to sound results in order to transform the process into a more effective political and military instrument for South Eastern Europe.

These tasks can be successful if strongly anchored in the unique security partnership network with the EU and NATO along the lines that NATO's Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen presented at the 7th annual Brussels Forum of the German Marshall Fund on 23 March 2012: "By working together with our partners, we enhance our own security. We enhance the security of their regions and the security of the world we live in".

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Chief CG1 (Personnel) Lieutenant Colonel Nikolay NIKOLOV (Na-2)

Tour of Duty

"Tour of Duty" is an American action-drama television series dedicated to the Vietnam War.

- Wikipedia


Despite the fact that the title of my article is the same as this American movie, the topic is not the Vietnam War, but the Tour of Duty (ToD) for the personnel in SEE-BRIG HQ regarding the Peace Establishment (PE). Nevermind that the term "Peace Establishment" sounds so peaceful, sometimes from a personal point of view, ToD may start as a planned action for the assigned person and may end as a drama for him and his family. Of course this is the worst case scenario, which has nothing to do with the war situation, but if we could improve something in our organizational policy, it seems logical to start working on it.

By writing this article I would like to explain the current situation of the applied rotation policy in SEEBRIG HQ, to compare some different options and also to explain some facts about it. The main goal is to present a proposal concerning ToD. All this information could be very useful and important for the future development of SEEBRIG structure and would show the way of making SEEBRIG more efficient and more capable.

As it is well know, SEEBRIG is not simply a multinational organization, above all it is an example of a successful initiative of multinational cooperation in our region. Behind this success lies the factor of well-trained personnel provided by nations on rotational basis. At the beginning, the ToD for all positions has been defined to be up to 2 years. This working model has given the opportunity for greater number of personnel to be part of SEEBRIG and to work in a multicultural environment. At the same time, everyone involved in such kind of environment starts its assignment with a period of take-over the position for at least 4-6 months and finishes with a period of hand-over the position of at least 1-2 months. So, it means that the real fruitful working time doesn't exceed one year and a half. During the all these years this cycle has been continuing repeatedly with some small variations up to now and even though it allows for many people to be part of this useful multinational initiative, it puts some limitations to reaching higher efficiency and capabilities. In addition to that, when the personal transfers happen at the same tame with the relocation of SEEBRIG HQ, the situation gets worse. We called this case **Double transfer trouble***.

Trying to overcome all these limitations and to find the way to have a more effective and capable tool for peace-keeping, all nations should start to align the ToD of their assigned in SEEBRIG HQ personnel at least in accordance with the NATO policy on personnel rotation.

This picture presents the structure of SEEBRIG HQ Peace Establishment in connection with the rotation policy. It consists of four types of rotational positions (M-multinational, H-host nation, B-bilateral and N-national). All the posts in the first three levels, going from the bottom to the top, are under national regulations or bilateral agreements. Their ToD is not a matter of MPFSEE Agreement and therefore, if there is a national will, should be very easy to be made a decision for the extending the mandate of the national positions.





On the top of the pyramid are located the main command positions: COMSEEBRIG, DCOSOPS and DCOSSUP, together with the staff of their offices. According to the present Agreement, the duration of their ToD is defined to be 2 years. All of them, combined with the CHAIRPERSON of the PMSC/SEDM-CC are mutually connected in such way to keep the balance among the Nations. Taking this into account, as well as the consensus model of making decisions, it means that all Nations should adopt the new extended ToD applicable also for this crucial part of the command chain in SEEBRIG HQ, and the sooner the better.

The comparison between the two options for rotation policy with different duration, based on the existing experience, can be seen in the table below:

To summarize, with overcoming the disadvantages resulting from the short period of ToD and using of the benefits of the longer rotation period, the personnel mandate for all SEEBRIG positions should be extended. Improving the organizational rotation policy in such way will allow SEEBRIG HQ to be more successful in fulfilling its tasks, will reinforce the personnel motivation for surpassing many challenges, and will add strength for development of its own capabilities.

Two - year Rotation Policy More than two - year Rotation Policy 1. More double transfer troubles. 1. Less double transfer troubles. 2. Smooth and consistent transition of 2. Difficulty in the transfer of organizational organizational culture. 3. More money spent for frequent rotations. 3. Saving money due to less personnel rotations. 4. Misalignment with the rotation policy in 4. Alignment with the NAT O rotation policy. 5. More involvement in the projects, exercises 5. Less immersion for the personnel in the 6. Higher readiness for possible mission projects, exercises etc. 6. Lower readiness for possible mission deployments. deployments.

^{*)...}According to Wikipedia, the page "Double transfer trouble" does not exist. This is because our friend and colleague LTC Vittorio GUERRIERO (CG4) invented the concept recently. Because of its briefness, simplicity and clarity, it's a matter of short time to obtain popularity.



Chief CG2 (Intelligence & CI) Lieutenant Colonel George PAPADOPOULOS (Na-3)

Today's Peacekeeping Operations around the World

Since the end of the Cold War, peace support operations have been repeatedly employed by the international community to respond to crises and stabilize conflict zones. At the same time, both the concept and conduct of peacekeeping has undergone a fundamental transformation. This evolution is still underway. In order to improve the international response to future crises, it is important to debate the lessons learned.

Peace-Keeping Operations

International peace-keeping operations are an important mechanism of the international community for resolving conflicts and dealing with crises. They may have both civil and military components.

International peace-keeping operations are intended to create stable, peaceful relations by civil and military means. They are generally based on a UN mandate, and are as a rule guided by the following principles:

- Impartiality;
- The consent of the conflicting parties to the deployment of the peace-keeping troops;
- Minimal use of force.

Since the end of the Cold War they have undergone further development, and today they often cover a more extensive range of duties and a more robust mandate than they used to. There has also been a sharp increase in the number of peace-keeping operations.

The development of peace-keeping operations

International peace-keeping operations have become a frequently-employed mechanism for resolving international conflicts and dealing with crises. Since the 1990s they have been further refined in a number of particular respects:

- More extensive range of duties: peace-keeping operations now often involve more tasks than they used to. They are no longer only responsible for keeping the conflicting parties apart: they also have other tasks such as: disarming fighters and reintegrating them into civil society, restoring state structures, holding elections and promoting human rights.
- A more robust mandate: peace-keeping operations today often have a more robust mandate, authorizing them to use limited force (in the sense of coercive military action) in order to defend and enforce their mandate.

- Increasing need: the number of peace-keeping operations has risen sharply since the end of the Cold War. This has also increased the need for personnel for this sort of operations.
- New international players: as well as the UN, other international organizations are now active in international peace-keeping operations NATO, the EU, the OSCE and the African Union (AU). In many cases the UN Security Council approves a mandate for a peace mission, and then transfers its execution to one of these organizations.

Current peacekeeping operations

UN

The work of the United Nations reaches every corner of the globe. It is the best known organization for peacekeeping, peacebuilding, conflict prevention and humanitarian assistance. There are currently 15 UN peacekeeping operations deployed on four continents.



■ Africa

United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)

On 9 July 2011 South Sudan became the newest country in the world. The birth of the Republic of South Sudan is the culmination of a six-year peace process which began with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005.

In adopting resolution 1996 (2011) on 8 July 2011, the Security Council determined that the situation faced by South Sudan continued to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region. The Security Council established the United Nations Mission in the



Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) for an initial period of one year, starting from 9 July 2011.

UNMISS is on the ground to consolidate peace and security and to help establish conditions for development.

United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA)

The Security Council, by its resolution 1990 of 27 June 2011, responded to the urgent situation in Sudan's Abyei region by establishing the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA). The Security Council was deeply concerned by the violence, escalating tensions and population displacement.

The operation will monitor the flashpoint border between north and south, and is authorized to use force in protecting civilians and humanitarian workers in Abyei.

UNISFA's establishment came after the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) reached an agreement in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to demilitarize Abyei and let Ethiopian troops to monitor the area.

UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)

MONUSCO took over from an earlier UN peacekeeping operation – the United Nations Organization Mission in Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) – on 1 July 2010. It was done in accordance with Security Council resolution 1925 of 28 May to reflect the new phase reached in the country.

The new mission has been authorized to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate relating, among other things, to the protection of civilians, humanitarian personnel and human rights defenders under imminent threat of physical violence and to support the Government of the DRC in its stabilization and peace consolidation efforts.

African Union-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)

The African Union/UN Hybrid operation in Darfur, referred to by its acronym UNAMID, was established on 31 July 2007 with the adoption of Security Council resolution 1769. UNAMID has the protection of civilians as its core mandate, but is also tasked with contributing to security for humanitarian assistance, monitoring and verifying implementation of agreements, assisting an inclusive political process, contributing to the promotion of human rights and the rule of law, and monitoring and reporting on the situation along the borders with Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR).

UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI)

Having determined that the situation in Côte d'Ivoire continued to pose a threat to international peace and security in the region and acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council, by its resolution 1528 (2004) of 27 February 2004, decided to establish the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) as from 4 April 2004. UNOCI replaced the United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (MINUCI), a political mission set up by the Council in May 2003 with a mandate to facilitate the implementation by the Ivorian parties of the peace agreement signed by them in January 2003.

Following the 2010 Presidential election and the ensuing political crisis in Côte d'Ivoire, UNOCI has remained on the ground to support the new Ivorian Government.

UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)

The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was established by Security Council resolution 1509 (2003) of 19 September 2003 to support the implementation of the ceasefire agreement and the peace process; protect United Nations staff, facilities and civilians; support humanitarian and human rights activities; as well as assist in national security reform, including national police training and formation of a new, restructured military.

UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)

The United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) was established by Security Council resolution 690 of 29 April 1991 in accordance with settlement proposals accepted on 30 August 1988 by Morocco and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro (Frente POLISARIO). The settlement plan, as approved by the Security Council, provided for a transitional period for the preparation of a referendum in which the people of Western Sahara would choose between independence and integration with Morocco. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General was to have sole and exclusive responsibility over matters relating to the referendum and was to be assisted in his tasks by an integrated group of civilian, military and civilian police personnel, to be known as the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara.

Americas

UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)

The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) was established on 1 June 2004 by Security Council resolution 1542. The UN mission succeeded a

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The devastating earthquake of 12 January 2010, which resulted in more than 220,000 deaths (according to Haitian Government figures), including 96 UN peacekeepers, delivered a severe blow to country's already shaky economy and infrastructure. The Security Council, by resolution 1908 of 19 January 2010, endorsed the Secretary-General's recommendation to increase the overall force levels of MINUSTAH to support the immediate recovery, reconstruction and stability efforts in the country.

Following the completion of Presidential elections in 2011, MINUSTAH has been working to fulfill its original mandate to restore a secure and stable environment, to promote the political process, to strengthen Haiti's Government institutions and rule-of-law-structures, as well as to promote and to protect human rights.

The Mission has continued to mobilize its logistical resources to assist in the effort to contain and treat the cholera outbreak of October 2010.

■ Asia and the Pacific

UN Integrated Mission in Timor - Leste (UNMIT)

UNMIT—a multidimensional, integrated UN peace-keeping operation— was established by Security Council resolution 1704 of 25 August 2006 in the wake of a major political, humanitarian and security crisis which erupted in Timor-Leste in April-May 2006. Among other things, UNMIT has been mandated to support the Government in "consolidating stability, enhancing a culture of democratic governance, and facilitating political dialogue among Timorese stakeholders, in their efforts to bring about a process of national reconciliation and to foster social cohesion".

UNMIT has replaced the UN Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL) which in turn was the latest in a series of successive United Nations operations or missions deployed in this country beginning in 1999.

UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)

The first group of United Nations military observers arrived in the mission area on 24 January of 1949 to supervise the ceasefire between India and Pakistan in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. These observers, under

the command of the Military Adviser appointed by the UN Secretary-General, formed the nucleus of the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP).

Following renewed hostilities of 1971, UNMOGIP has remained in the area to observe developments pertaining to the strict observance of the ceasefire of 17 December 1971 and report thereon to the Secretary-General.

Europe

UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)

UNFICYP was originally set up by the Security Council in 1964 to prevent further fighting between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities. After the hostilities of 1974, the Council has mandated the Force to perform certain additional functions.

In the absence of a political settlement to the Cyprus problem, UNFICYP has remained on the island to supervise ceasefire lines, maintain a buffer zone, undertake humanitarian activities and support the good offices mission of the Secretary-General.

UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)

Originally, the Security Council, by its resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999, authorized the Secretary-General to establish an international civil presence in Kosovo – the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UN-MIK) – in order to provide an interim administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo could enjoy substantial autonomy. Its task was unprecedented in complexity and scope; the Council vested UNMIK with authority over the territory and people of Kosovo, including all legislative and executive powers and administration of the judiciary.

Subsequently, following the declaration of independence by the Kosovo authorities and the entry into force of a new constitution on 15 June 2008, the tasks of the Mission have significantly been modified to focus primarily on the promotion of security, stability and respect for human rights in Kosovo.

■ Middle East

UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)

From early March 1974, the situation in the Israel-Syria sector became increasingly unstable, and firing intensified.



The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UN-DOF) was established on 31 May 1974 by Security Council resolution 350 (1974), following the agreed disengagement of the Israeli and Syrian forces in the Golan Heights.

Since then, UNDOF has remained in the area to maintain the ceasefire between the Israeli and Syrian forces and to supervise the implementation of the disengagement agreement.

United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)

Originally, UNIFIL was created by the Security Council in March 1978 to confirm Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, restore international peace and security and assist the Lebanese Government in restoring its effective authority in the area. The mandate had to be adjusted twice, due to the developments in 1982 and 2000.

Following the July/August 2006 crisis, the Council enhanced the Force and decided that in addition to the original mandate, it would, among other things, monitor the cessation of hostilities; accompany and support the Lebanese armed forces as they deploy throughout the south of Lebanon; and extend its assistance to help ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons.

UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)

Set up in May 1948, UNTSO was the first ever peace-keeping operation established by the United Nations. Since then, UNTSO military observers have remained in the Middle East to monitor ceasefires, supervise armistice agreements, prevent isolated incidents from escalating and assist other UN peacekeeping operations in the region to fulfill their respective mandates.

UNTSO personnel have also been available at short notice to form the nucleus of some other peacekeeping operations worldwide. The availability of UNTSO's military observers for almost immediate deployment after the Security Council had acted to create a new mission has been an enormous contributory factor to the early deployment and the success of those operations.

■ NATO

NATO is an active and leading contributor to peace and security on the international stage. Since its first major peace-support operation in the Balkans in the early 1990s, the tempo and diversity of NATO operations have increased. Today, over 140 000 military personnel are engaged in NATO missions around the world.



Afghanistan

NATO's operation in Afghanistan currently constitutes the Alliance's most significant operational commitment to date. Established by UN mandate in 2001, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has been under NATO leadership since August 2003.

ISAF comprises just over 130 000 troops from 50 different countries deployed throughout Afghanistan. Its mission is to extend the authority of the Afghan central government in order to create an environment conducive to the functioning of democratic institutions and the establishment of the rule of law.

A major component of this mission is the establishment of professional Afghan National Security Forces that, step by step, will enable Afghans to assume more and more responsibility for the security of their country. Much progress has already been made. From a non-existent force in 2003, the Afghan army currently comprises approximately 175,000 soldiers, and has begun taking the lead in most operations.

In addition to conducting security operations and building up the Afghan army and police, ISAF is also directly involved in facilitating the development and reconstruction of Afghanistan through 28 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) which are engaged in identifying reconstruction needs and supporting humanitarian assistance activities throughout the country.

Kosovo

While Afghanistan remains NATO's primary operational theatre, the Alliance has not faltered on its other commitments, particularly in the Balkans. Today, approximately 5,500 Allied troops operate in the Balkans as part of NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR).

Having first entered Kosovo in June 1999 to end widespread violence and halt the humanitarian disaster, KFOR troops continue to maintain a strong presence throughout the territory, preserving the peace that was imposed by NATO nearly a decade earlier. Following Kosovo's declaration of independence in February 2008, NATO agreed it would continue to maintain its presence on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 1244. In June 2008, the Alliance decided to take on responsibility for supervising the dissolution of the Kosovo Protection Corps and to help create a professional and multiethnic Kosovo Security Force.

Supporting the African Union

Well beyond the Euro-Atlantic region, the Alliance continues to support the African Union (AU) in its peace-keeping missions on the African continent.

Since June 2007, NATO has assisted the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) by providing airlift support for AU peacekeepers. Following renewed AU requests, the North Atlantic Council has agreed to extend its support by periods of six months and has done this on several occasions. NATO also continues to work with the AU in identifying further areas where NATO could support the African Standby Force.

EU

Over the last decade, the European Security and Defence Policy, has grown in experience and capability, with over 20 missions deployed in response to crises. The ongoing, not just peacekeeping, but military operations are:

EUFOR ALTHEA



The Council of the European Union decided on 12 July 2004 to conduct a military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) in the framework of the EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The EUFOR ALTHEA operation was launched on 2 December 2004.

This EU-led operation adds in a significant way to the EU's political engagement, its assistance programmes and its ongoing police and monitoring missions with a view to helping BiH make further progress towards European integration in the context of

the Stabilization and Association Process.

On 21 March 2011, the Council of the EU underlines the EU's CSDP missions, namely the EU Police Mission (EUPM) and EUFOR Althea, as important elements of its overall strategy for Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Council reiterates its agreement to keep these missions under regular review, including on the basis of the situa-

tion on the ground, with a view to assessing in the future EU engagement in this area.

EUTM Somalia

On 25 January 2010, the Council agreed to set up a military mission to contribute to training of Somali security forces.

The 7 April 2010, the EU launched a military training mission in order to contribute to strengthening the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the institutions of Somalia.

The training of Somali security forces has started in May 2010. This mission takes place in Uganda where Somali forces are already being trained, which also facilitate the coordination of the EU action with the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The mission is conducted in close coordination with EU partners, including the TFG of Somalia, Uganda, the African Union, the United Nations and the United States of America.

On 21 March 2011, the EU recalled that there can be no purely military solution to the crisis in Somalia. The EU reaffirms its support for AMISOM and praises the commitment and bravery of the AMISOM peacekeeping troops who, together with the security forces of the TFG, have paid a heavy toll to help build security for the Somali people.

EU NAVFOR - ATALANTA

The European Union is concerned with the continuing impact of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia on international maritime security and on the economic activities and security of countries in the region. As a result and as part of a comprehensive approach, the EU has launched European Naval Force Somalia - Operation ATALANTA (EU NAVFOR - ATALANTA) within the framework of the European Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and in accordance with relevant UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) and International Law.

After the launch of EU NAVFOR - Operation ATA-LANTA in December 2008, the operation continues to successfully perform its mission and contributes to improving maritime security off the coast of Somalia and in the Indian Ocean. The Council of the EU has decided to extend the operation until December 2012

OSCE

OSCE's activities cover many aspects of security from "hard" security issues such as conflict prevention to fostering economic development, ensuring the sustainable use of natural resources, and promoting the full respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Its most important missions are:





Mission in Kosovo

In 1992, the then Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE, now OSCE) deployed the first Missions to Kosovo, Sandzak and Vojvodina in the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Their mandate was not renewed the following year.

From October 1998 to March 1999, the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM), the largest and most challenging OSCE operation up to that date, was deployed to verify the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's compliance with UN Security Council Resolutions 1160 and 1199. The purpose of the KVM was to verify the ceasefire, monitor movement of forces, and promote human rights and democracy-building. When the security situation deteriorated in Kosovo in March 1999, the KVM was withdrawn. It ceased to exist on 9 June when the Permanent Council established a transitional OSCE Task Force for Kosovo. On 1 July 1999 the Task Force for Kosovo was dissolved and replaced by the OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMIK). Currently, the OSCE Mission in Kosovo carries out activities in the following main areas: human and community rights monitoring and promotion, support to democratic institutions and good governance, and public safety and security.

Mission to Skopje

The OSCE Mission to Skopje is the Organization's longest-serving field mission. In 2001, during a seven-month conflict in the country, the strength of the Mission grew steadily in response to an increased need. Following the internationally-brokered Ohrid Framework Agreement of August that year, which sealed the end of the fighting by ensuring the rights of all in the country, the OSCE took on an enhanced mandate which eventually more than quadrupled the size of the Mission. The objective of the Mission is to monitor developments along the borders of the Host Country with Serbia and in other areas of the Host Country which may suffer from spillover of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, in order to promote respect for territorial integrity and the maintenance of peace, stability and security; and to help prevent possible conflict in the region.

Mission to Moldova

In spring 1992, the conflict between the Transdniestrian authorities and the central government in Chisinau escalated. Violent clashes resulted in several hundred casualties and more than 100,000 refugees. A ceasefire was agreed in July 1992 and the parties committed themselves to negotiate a settlement to the conflict. In 1993, the OSCE (then the CSCE) established a Mission in Moldova to support efforts to find a peaceful solution to this conflict. The Mission started work in Moldova's capital Chisinau in April of the same year. It opened a branch office in the Transdniestrian administrative centre Tiraspol in February 1995 and an Office in Bender in May 2003.

The primary objective of the mission is to facilitate the achievement of a lasting, comprehensive political settlement of the Transdniestrian conflict in all its aspects. On 9 December 1999, the scope of the mandate was expanded to include, ensuring transparency of the removal and destruction of Russian ammunition and armaments, coordinating financial and technical assistance to facilitate such withdrawal and destruction.

Conclusion

Going trough this big list we realize that modern peace-keeping operations are often very complex, and place high demands on the personnel deployed. Peacekeepers must know what is expected of them. They require mandates that reflect clear and achievable objectives, as well as guidance and the necessary training and support to execute all tasks assigned to them.

Effective peacekeeping requires a more capability-driven approach that seeks to improve the performance of peacekeeping on the ground by linking clear operational tasks and standards with capacity-building and training programmes, equipment and support needs, and, as appropriate, incentives to deliver mandated tasks.

High levels of training are required before deployment, and troop-contributing countries ought to strengthen training and education of personnel across all peace-keeping components through pre-deployment training modules and mission-specific scenario-based training as well as exercises. Also they have to develop guidance and baseline capability requirements for different peacekeeping functions, including updated job descriptions, capability standards, and readiness indicators.

Together, these elements constitute a framework aimed at developing a stronger culture of performance in peace-keeping.



Chief CG3 (Operations & Training) Major Mehmet DEMIRHISAR (Na-7)

A Projection on SEEBRIG Perspective: Training and Mentoring

INTRODUCTION:

While approaching 12 years of history, SEEBRIG remains an important, effective, and experienced multinational military formation, a contributor in promoting peace and stability, a valuable training facility and a good example of defense cooperation.

The rapid changes of the operational and security environment may require that SEEBRIG needs to adapt itself in order to become more efficient. It may require more effective military capabilities to better address these security concerns. Given the new security environment, it is imperative to work closely with a larger circle of partners. It should be realized to revise and redefine the SEEBRIG capabilities tailored for Training and Mentoring purposes. It is time to assess the necessity for a new concept for SEEBRIG giving our ideas and proposals and especially trying to optimize the capabilities deriving from the current structure and institutional provisions. SEEBRIG has gained precious knowledge by conducting and participating in several exercises and has obtained a valuable experience from the KMNB IX mission in Afghanistan(2006). An additional asset to the continuous improvement is the Full Operational Capability (FOC), currently CREVAL (Combat Readiness Evaluation) evaluation performed by NATO Joint Force Command Naples in 2004. The efforts for achieving full operational capabilities using common NATO standards, procedures, and concepts have transformed SEEBRIG into a structure capable of deploying and participating in Peace Support Operations (PSOs) and Humanitarian and Disaster Relief Operations (DROs).

LEGAL BASIS:

a. UN Charter and MPFSEE Agreement with its additional protocols constitute the main SEEBRIG *legal base* which allows SEEBRIG to participate PSOs and DROs.

b.It is important to note that according to the MPFSEE Agreement, Article III Para 2, SEEBRIG will not participate in Peace Enforcement Operations defined as operations under Chapter VII of UN Charter, which *constitutes a legal limitation for* SEEBRIG.

CURRENT CAPABILITIES:

- a. The Force is available for possible employment in UN or OSCE-mandated NATO-led or EU-led conflict prevention and other peace support operations. It can also participate in "coalition of the willing" type international initiatives. The Force is also function "within the spirit" of PfP". Therefore:
- SEEBRIG HQ is operationally capable to conduct Peace Support Operations or –not simultaneously- limited (in terms of time response and physical Engineer Units capabilities) Disaster Relief Operations as described in the MPFSEE Agreement and the respective documents,
- SEEBRIG is capable to activate its own internal operational decision making process, immediately after MPF-SEE Nations decision for employment of the Brigade in an operation is taken,
- SEEBRIG operational decision-making process is supported with proper official documentation that regulates all its necessary activities,
- SEEBRIG HQ is capable to command and control all the assigned units as a whole or part of them as shown in the above mentioned scenarios,
- Possible Modes of employment:
 - Full SEEBRIG (HQ, HQ COY, SIG COY, assigned units).
 - Task Force (HQ, HQ COY, SIG COY, some of the assigned units according to the mission).
 - Only SEEBRIG HQ (CE) supported by a HQ COY and SIG COY.
 - Only Nucleus Staff supported by a part of HQ COY and SIG COY.
 - Mission tailored employment, that is, Sections of SEEBRIG HQ supported or not by one or two assigned units.



- b. Additionally, SEEBRIG is capable to:
- Manage small scale employment scenarios based on particularities and requirements of some specific missions decided by MPFSEE Nations,
- Deal with Decision Making Process, Command and Control, Operations, and Training,
- Plan, coordinate and conduct Collective, Functional, and Individual training of SEEBRIG HQ staff (PE and CE).
- c. SEEBRIG is primarily a Peace Keeping Force lacking capacity to be engaged in full combat operations (i.e. Peace Enforcement Operations). Additionally SEEBRIG has limited DRO capabilities.

TRAINING AND MENTORING:

- **a. Training.** Military training is a process which intends to establish and improve the capabilities of military personnel in their respective roles.
- b. Mentoring. The process of forming and maintaining intensive and lasting developmental relationships between a variety of leaders and junior personnel. Mentoring is the principal mean by which commanders develop leaders. Leaders counsel by reviewing a subordinate's demonstrated performance and potential. It tends to focus on skills and tasks. Mentoring occurs through a developmental relationship between a person of greater experience and a person of lesser experience. Army leadership defines different types of counseling: Event counseling covers a specific event or situation; while performance counseling reviews a subordinate's duty performance during a specific period of time; and professional counseling has a developmental orientation and assists subordinates in identifying and achieving individual goals and goals of their organization.
- c. Training and Mentoring. This is a NATO doctrine thought for building self sufficient units located in countries which have experienced traumatic events. The aim is to speed up the desirable end-state of the International Community, in order to facilitate the adequate conditions for the consolidation of stability in the area, without need for an international assistance force.

The goal is to train the units giving them all the needed skills to upgrade their military professionalism and in the same time to provide them wisdom, guidance and counseling during the execution of the task, by employing practically what they learned in advance, under the coordination of the mentor. It has been materialized in IRAQ, as NATO Training Mission Iraq (NTM-I) and in Afghanistan as NTM-A and as Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT). For the time being, to be

- more effective and to speed up the preparation of Afghan Military Forces, NATO is modifying the OMLT doctrine to become Military Advisor Team (MAT) doctrine. As it is described briefly, some tasks can be summarized as follows:
- Provide the appropriate level of leadership and subject matter experts required to advise the trainees they are aligned to,
- Co-locate with or in close coordination to the higher command that they are aligned to at any level of effectiveness,
- Advise on all functional areas within the unit for continued development of capabilities including staff procedures at battalion level or brigade level,
- Assist trainees with autonomous capability to perform routine organizational functions,
- Assist the trainees in understanding and applying current doctrine, and in developing training plans consistent with the doctrine,
- Coordinate and liaise with higher command when planning and conducting any PSOs or DROs,
- Assist the trainees with the development, execution, and after action reviews of tactics, techniques and procedures,
- Provide planning assistance and advice for the execution of PSOs and DROs,
- Conduct periodic assessments of trainees/units/HQ's performance and progress,
- Submit End of Tour Report identifying key lessons learned

CONSTRAINTS, LIMITATIONS & SHORTFALLS FOR A SEEBRIG TRAINING AND MENTORING MISSION

- a. Operational/training constraints:
- SEEBRIG should be embedded in a command structure in order to gain the most suitable end state,
- SEEBRIG operational capabilities are limited by lack of CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Warfare) and air management capabilities (G3 Air) as well as air assets,
- Mentoring and training require a different conceptual approach in terms of preparation of personnel (scenarios, standing operational procedure and methods) to execute. Cross training between PE, CE and augmentees could be affected in case of short-notice missions,
- SEEBRIG documents and procedures are based on those of NATO. However, in some cases updates might

be needed. Therefore, before the assignment of a mission it might be necessary a time period for familiarizing the personnel with the latest NATO doctrine and procedures.

b. Logistics:

Any shortfalls in providing the necessary logistic contributions (even if only elements) as arranged in Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) or SEEBRIG Agreement can affect that related specific logistic function.

c.CIS:

SEEBRIG does not have a secure connectivity system (like NATO SECRET network) in order to exchange encrypted information. CIS capabilities should be updated according to the latest NATO requirements and become adaptable to the mission.

CONCLUSION

SEEBRIG is capable of participating in a mission in accordance with the current MPFSEE Agreement. According to the SEEBRIG documents (Directives, Plans, SOPs) the activities that SEEBRIG is able to deal with are those included in Chapter VI of UN Charter and first of all PSOs, Peace Building Operations, Transition Assistance, Humanitarian Operations and DROs with the exemption of Peace Enforcement Operations due to the restrictions included in the Agreement that prevent the involvement of SEEBRIG units in full combat operations.

SEEBRIG is fully capable to provide training and/or mentoring to a military unit up to the Brigade and Battalion HQ level.

SEEBRIG stands also ready to provide training and/or mentoring to an HQ up to the level of Brigade in order to be aware and familiarized with SEEBRIG HQ procedures and functions.

SEEBRIG has personnel who have the ability to be efficient trainers and/or mentors for the whole spectrum of military operations within their area of expertise. However, for SEEBRIG as a whole to undertake a much broader or more specific training/mentoring mission a period of prior training might be needed. The extent of this training would depend on the task.

SEEBRIG, with the above mentioned capabilities, limitations, and constraints, is capable to train and mentor units at Brigade and Battalion HQ level, focusing on the staff work procedures for generic scenarios related to PSOs, PKOs and DROs as follows:

- The trainees are trained in SEEBRIG HQ: This option appears the most affordable, since it only requires an agreement to support and supply the trainees in the host nation where SEEBRIG HQ is located. Probably it would be better also for the trainees, because they have the possibility to verify "de facto" the way and the procedures by which an HQ works in its usual work environment.
- SEEBRIG with all allocated units (HQ, HQ COY, SIG COY, + only military personnel needed from units): In order to accomplish this option all contributing countries would make a huge effort, never experienced before, since moving all forces from their home countries to the ToO (Teather of Operation) and the constitution of the CSS BN will be needed. This option appears not advisable taking into account existing financial constraints. It could be only justified by an extraordinary situation requesting such kind of task.
- Task Group/Force, especially SEEBRIG with some of allocated units (HQ, HQ COY, SIG COY, + only military personnel needed from units): This option, as the previous one, is still very expensive for all SEEBRIG contributing nations due to the same considerations.
- Only SEEBRIG HQ (CE) supported by HQ COY and SIG COY: Even this option appears unaffordable for the same reasons explained in the previous paragraphs, since it counts the HQ Contingency Establishment plus potential augmentees, according to the mission.
- Only Nucleus Staff (PE) supported by a mission tailored HQ COY and SIG COY: It could be the most suitable way to accomplish an hypothetic task, since the effort would be focused on employing the Nucleus Staff as a whole (composed of 42 Officers and NCOs) and a mission tailored deployment of HQ Coy and Signal Coy as supporting assets, with the purpose to teach working staff procedures to a training audience with the necessity to be prepared and formed according to SEEBRIG procedures (that rely on NATO and EU doctrine and documents).

A training and mentoring task is a new concept for SEE-BRIG, possible modifications and amendments of the Agreement might be needed in order to better deal with such a task.

SEEBRIG remains eager and motivated for this new challenge which will open new perspectives for the brigade and enrich its capabilities.



Chief CG4 (Logistics) Lieutenant Colonel Vittorio GUERRIERO (Na-4)

■ A SEEBRIG Force Multiplier – The Medical Support



Every military commander, since the beginning of time, has had to understand that elementary needs of his personnel must be satisfied in order to receive from every soldier the maximum effort for gaining victory on the battlefield.

One of these needs is health care. Everyone wearing a uniform, in fact, is conscious of the level of danger involved in our professional life. In operations this perception increases with the risk that affects individual capability to deliver the right performance. SEEBRIG, as an operational unit, is organized to do the best in giving to the personnel the expected medical assistance.

Here we will show how this particular logistic activity, properly planned and executed, can become a force multiplier.

The medical treatment in operations must comply with the Geneva Convention as well as with a minimum acceptable standard. It must be delivered, without any discrimination, to all sick injured or wounded military or civilian personnel, within available resources.

The spectrum of treatments consists of preventive medicine, first aid, emergency resuscitation and stabilization of vital functions, evacuation and specialized care.

Treatments can be divided in:

-ADVACED TRAUMA CARE that should be available within one hour of injury (first aid, resuscitation and stabilization, triage);

- EVACUATION to more suitable treatment places should be provided within not more that two hours;
- PRIMARY SURGERY available not later than four hours;
- SPECIALISED CARE available until the complete recovery and return to duty.

In any case, medical care must be available continuously.

ROLEs.

According to treatment capability, medical facilities are divided in four categories, called ROLEs:

- ROLE 1. Is a medical facility that is able to deliver first aid, resuscitation and stabilization, triage, and evacuation from point of injury to ROLE 2. It is allocated to small units (battalion/company) and for multinational forces is a national responsibility;
- ROLE 2. Basically established at brigade level, this is a facility provided by a Lead Nation. There injured soldiers can have a limited time hospitalization as well as more specialized treatments. Sometimes it can include also dental care, psychiatry and psychology and in any case is organized to provide for the evacuation to ROLE 3.

- ROLE 4. Is the home country medical system where the patient, particularly injured or ill, can receive definitive care. It is important to underline that the evacuation to and from ROLE 4 is a national responsibility.

MEDICAL LOGISTICS.

Medical materials enjoy a special protected status due to them sensitiveness. They require specific holding rules (blood, radiological devices) and are subject to national restrictions (vaccines, poisons). Moreover very often supply is expensive and requires complicated administrative procedures. For this reasons, Medical Logistics is a national responsibility.

SEEBRIG MEDICAL SUPPORT IN OPERATIONS.



Due to its multinational character, the logistic support of SEEBRIG Forces is mainly a National responsibility. It is organized according to current doctrine and needs some small necessary ad-

justments. So, in the specific case of medical support, every national contingent deployed within SEEBREG receives medical care (i.e. preventive medicine, first aid, emergency resuscitation and stabilization) by its own ROLE 1 that, instead of what was the general concept presented before, is integral part of the National Support Element (NSE).

See the following diagram:

Above national ROLEs 1 there is the SEEBRIG ROLE 2. This structure, able to give more specialized treatments (dental care and injured holding included) is inserted within Combat Service Support (CSS) Battalion and is operated by Nation 7 that provides the Medical Platoon for the Brigade.


G4 Section coordinates SEEBRIG Medical Support through its G4 MED Officer.

ROLE 1 medical support is a tactical structure whose deployable assets are the Mobile Medical Teams (MMT). A typical MMT (allocated also to small units and sometimes called inadvertently ROLE 1) is composed of one doctor, one nurse, one driver and a tactical ambulance (armored) that is equipped to provide for first response to casualties and has its own dedicated communication systems.

ROLE 1 is also responsible to personnel evacuation from the point of injuring to ROLE 1 and from ROLE 1 to ROLE 2.

Other important tasks fulfilled by ROLE 1 are related to specific responsibilities of the National Contingent Commander in operations in terms of preventive/legal medicine, like disinfection, health care/prevention, food inspections, water purification, blood and drugs management, and release of official documentation.

ROLE 2 functions are performed by the Medical Platoon (Nation 7) that is part of the Combat Service Support (CSS) Battalion. It provides for more specialized care than ROLE 1 does. In spite of remaining a mobile structure, ROLE 2 is organized to provide for primary surgery as well as holding of the injured. It is equipped with an X-ray room, dentist facilities, and an analysis laboratory. In the following table it is possible to see the different responsibilities among roles as well as the necessary overlapping of some treatments.



		MMT	ROLE 1	ROLE 2
	FIRST RESPONSE	X		
	NATIONAL LEGAL MEDICINE		X	
	FIRST AID		X	X
/	RESUSCITATION & STABILISTATION		X	X
	TRIAGE		X	X
	VETRINARY		X	X
	EVACUATION		X	X
	RECEPTION			X
	PRIMARY SRGERY			X
	HOLDING OF THE INJURED			X



The most important medical support principle is the continuity of the assistance to people in need, until their definitive return to duty.

Every unit (Battalion/Coy and sometimes Platoon) is deployed with one or more MMTs, in coordination with the national Role1. The team intervenes on the accident scene and provides the necessary care (first response) to all personnel involved. The doctor then decides about the evacuation timeline and asks for the necessary intervention of his ROLE 1.

As it is possible to see in the following pattern, according to the urgency, the evacuation is divided in:

- A (URGENT): critical instability of vital functions evacuation to ROLE1 in 1 or 2 hours;
- B (PRIORITY): serious injuries that eventually will require surgical treatment, vital signs stable evacuation to ROLE1 in 4 or 6 hours;
- C (ROUTINE): minor injuries that do not require hospital treatment evacuation to ROLE 1 up to 24 hours or not necessary.

Now the patient is in the ROLE1 where every necessary emergency cares is given (first aid, resuscitation and stabilization). After that, the ROLE 1 Chief decides for the evacuation to a higher level structure (if necessary) for intensive treatment.

Looking at the green arrows (see the following picture) it is clear that the next destination of the injured is the ROLE 2. This structure is equipped to give a more precise diagnosis.

At this point the injured is on his way to recovery so ROLE 3 (in theater) or ROLE 4 (in the home country) are able to provide the best care from a medical perspective.

Before concluding, it is necessary to mention what happens in the Rear Area of Operations and in particular when the units reach the theater to be stationed in the marshaling area (before their movement to the assembly area in the Forward Area of Operations).

In this case the medical support is provided by MMTs assigned to each unit since the departure from respective home bases.

MMTs will be supported by a ROLE 1(-) assembled in the Log Base Rear by SEEBRIG ROLE 2 elements.


The definitive integration in the NSE ROLE 1 will take place only when the unit will reach the Forward Area of Operations.

Conclusion.

These few lines give an overview on SEEBRIG medical support. The complex detailed organization and its reliability have been highlighted.

In conclusion, every SEEBRIG soldier can benefit from such a reliable organization, benefiting from such professional generous people as well as modern means is able to ensure that everyone gets back home safe.

This generates among the troops the necessary confidence to do their best in fulfilling the assigned tasks; so in fewer words: it is a true force multiplier.





Chief CG5 (CIMIC) Major Daniel NATU (Na-6)

☐ CIMIC (Civil-Military Cooperation)in Multi-Dimensional Peace Support Operations

CIMIC will not win any war, but without CIMIC will be impossible to win the peace.

As no contemporary peace support operation takes place without the presence and the involvement of a complex civilian environment, the ability to manage the impact of this environment on military operations and vice versa has become critically important for both political leaders and military commanders.

The advent of peace operations following the creation of the UN (United Nations) has been characterized by diverse and evolving challenges which ranged from conventional war to "traditional" UN peacekeeping, and also to complex crisis response operations involving civil wars, failed states, international or regional security organizations, coalitions of the willing, IOs (International Organizations), NGOs (Non-Governmental Organizations), insurgencies, terrorism, natural or man-made disasters, reconstruction, extreme poverty, arms trafficking, human rights violations and much more.

Such multi-dimensional peace support operations (conducted according to internationally agreed norms) require an approach integrating military and humanitarian action into peacebuilding efforts through a plethora of specific activities from observing the cease fire and assisting in humanitarian relief and refugee resettlement to contributing to economic reconstruction, social reconciliation and the restoration of essential government functions. Noteworthy to this approach are the simultaneous control of violence at the interpersonal and inter-groups levels, the provision of the basic needs for the civilians in need, and, as required, the planning for and monitoring of reconciliation and reconstruction efforts. These requirements are to be achieved through a combination of traditional peacekeeping functions (as the supervision and monitoring of cease-fires, disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, and overseeing of elections) and also through conventional and less conventional combat related activities when necessary.

Even with modern armed forces increasingly recognizing the intensifying working relationship between military and civilian actors, with international security organizations having developed their own doctrines spec-

ifying the nature of civil-military cooperation/coordination (CIMIC) and with many nations having established specialized staffs and units to be trained and employed accordingly, the reality of a fluid security environment requires continuous adaptation of the CIMIC capability components (doctrine, training and personnel) in general, and of SEEBRIG CIMIC in particular, to the reality of contemporary multi-dimensional peace support operations with foresight for the future.

Historically, when military forces undertook civilian tasks such as humanitarian relief and public administration by default in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo until civilian authorities were in a position to take over humanitarian and governing responsibilities, the soldiers very often found themselves unprepared for such non-military tasks and quickly realized that their success would depend increasingly on their ability to cooperate with both the international actors present in their area of responsibility (UN and other civilian aid agencies) and with the local leaders and populations on the ground whose cooperation and support was crucial for the success of the mission.

Acknowledging these realities, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) published its CIMIC Doctrine (AJP 9) in 2003. CIMIC was then defined as "the coordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organizations and agencies". Essentially, civil-military cooperation in operations included three core functions: liaison between the military and all civilian actors in the area of operations, assistance to the civil environment, and support to the military force - resulting that CIMIC was designed as a specialized interface intended to improve coordination and reduce overlap and duplication of efforts between military and civilian organizations and authorities. The complete establishment of CIMIC forces as per NATO Doctrine comprised the CIMIC staff officers in the HQs (Headquarters), tactical CIMIC units in the field and the CIMIC Functional Specialists with expertise in civilian



administration, infrastructure and services wherever they were needed. However, the minimum requirement for a passable CIMIC capability was to have CIMIC doctrinal documents, the understanding and the ability to implement the doctrine, and dedicated CIMIC staff officers at all HQ levels (which was reflected as such in the initial design of SEEBRIG CIMIC structure and SOPs - Standard Operating Procedures).

Later, practical guidance in the implementation of CIMIC

field works came in the form of NATO Allied Command Operations (ACO) Manual 86-1-1 "ACO CIMIC Tactics, Techniques and Procedures" which was derived largely from the experience of NATO operations in the Balkans.

This doctrinal framework was put to severe test when NATO expanded its operations outside Europe and was confronted with more complex challenges than in the Balkans, leading to an increased demand for a more comprehensive approach - political, civilian and military - with new concepts, tactics, techniques and procedures. Such an approach might be the only key to mission success in a multi-dimensional peace support operation and CIMIC will have a key role to play in any future scenario for such operations.

While at strategic level this demand was addressed in the new NATO Strategic Concept 2010, lower level doctrine has still to fully incorporate and standardize the experience from latest operations. For a better adaptation to future multi-dimensional peace support operations, new overall topics for thinking and

implementation in CIMIC doctrine and training would be related to redefining the role of CIMIC within the Comprehensive Approach, its relation with counterinsurgency operations, anti-terrorist operations (to include cyber-terrorism), maritime (anti-piracy) operations, NATO Training Missions, the better integration with Information Operations, the development of more complex assessment tools, the integration with Information/Knowledge Management, the integration with the concept of PRTs

(Provincial/Provisional Reconstruction Teams), the compensation of the small number of specialized field CIMIC units and personnel through allocation of generic/less specialized CIMIC tasks to all units on the ground upon appropriate training (perhaps using the model of the United States Civil-Military Operations concept). In such an approach, CIMIC will be redefined as a multidimensional function enhancing the military commander's capabilities to contribute to the overall mission by enabling and sustaining conditions in the civil-military engagement space

that will ensure obtaining mission objectives thereby maximizing the effectiveness of the military contribution.

CIMIC – Liaison





SEEBRIG HQ, as part of a contemporary regional initiative with focus on security and cooperation, is continually striving for an up-to-date CIMIC capability. Upon adoption of the 5th Additional Protocol to Multinational Peace Force South Eastern Europe, the structure of SEEBRIG will benefit from the value-added by a specialized CIMIC field element in its Crises Establishment. This addition will also require that effective concepts for training and employment of the new asset to be developed along with incorporation of new relevant doctrine published by major security organizations and of lessons learned from the experience of previous SEEBRIG HQ deployment to Afghanistan, from the experience of National Units and from experience of individual staff allocated to SEEBRIG. A particular attention should be devoted to establishment of a clear procedure for funding of the CIMIC projects to be implemented by SEEBRIG in the event of an operation.

The way ahead for CIMIC is one full of challenges and increased responsibility, but there is clearly the way to go and the CIMIC staff of SEEBRIG HQ will stay tuned to the latest developments in the field of civil-military cooperation in multi-dimensional peace support operations in order to effectively contribute to an increased readiness of SEEBRIG for successful future deployments.

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Frequency Management Officer 1st Lieutenant Iva IVANOVA (Na-2)

Developing and Updating SEEBRIG's Communications & Information Systems(CIS) in Accordance with NATO Requirements for Participation in Peace Support Operations

Being an organization of both NATO and PfP Nations holds many advantages for SEEBRIG. However, one major disadvantage is that SEEBRIG cannot participate easily in NATO missions. The answer to this issue is to be found in the word "compliance". This means that the brigade's documents, procedures and equipment should meet the NATO requirements.

This article explains how SEEBRIG develops and updates its communications and information systems (CIS) in order to comply with these requirements.

What has been done in this direction so far? Before SEE-BRIG's mission in Afghanistan (2006) some new equipment was bought and the responsible personnel were trained to use it. This equipment included: Strategic Mobile Satellite Devices; Fixed Satellite Devices such as IN-MARSAT antennas and Iridium Satphones; new Harris Radio Stations and Radio Shelters on Land Rover and on Mercedes; Improved Digital Phones; TETRA system; Tactical Area information System; new computers, faxes and other specific equipment. After the mission was completed successfully the broken items were repaired and the maintenance of the brigade's CIS equipment continued.

Unfortunately, due to the relocation of the SEEBRIG HQ, the trained CIS experts were replaced by a new crew of CIS specialists of the new Host Nation and the new staff needed specific education on the brigade's equipment. SEEBRIG keeps an account in NAMSA (NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency), with the purpose to financially support the periodical training of new personnel. Such training is due to take place in 2012 in SEEBRIG HQ. The training is going to be on Mobile Satellite Communications and will be held by NAMSA specialists.

Another NATO agency which closely cooperates with SEEBRIG on CIS matters is NC3A (NATO Consultation, Command, and Control Agency). In February 2012 NC3A proposed to support the SEESIM exercise. The agency also proposes a set of NATO tools and services to help SEEBRIG upgrade its Command and Control sys-

tem. This proposal was announced during a PMSC meeting in Rome and its most valuable (yet most expensive) feature is the phased implementation, training, and support to a C2ISR (Command, Control, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) system. This proposal is in the process of discussion. Apart from that, SEEBRIG will continue its fruitful collaboration with NC3A.

In addition to the external help the brigade receives, the CIS Section together with the CIS Company constantly improve the level of expertise of the specialized personnel. Radio trainings are held monthly and experts are being summoned if necessary. The brigade's CIS plays a significant role in the two major exercises – SEESIM and SEVEN STARS.

What is yet to be done? For the involvement of SEEBRIG in NATO Peace Support Operations it is important for the brigade to constantly receive updated documents concerning the missions. Most of these documents are classified that is why the G6 section considers it crucial to have access to the NATO Secret Network. One way to overcome this shortcoming would be SEEBRIG to acquire encrypting machines and train operators for them in order to create a NATO Secret Slot. This idea deserves further consideration.



Engineer Plans Officer Lieutenant Colonel Konstantinos PLATSAS (Na-3)

Improvised Explosive Devices "Homemade" Death in Peace Support Operations

"Nothing depends on luck, but all on good judgment and foresight" (Μηδέν της τύχης αλλά πάντα της ευβουλιας είναι και της προνοίας)

- Plutarch



In the contemporary world affairs, the need to carry out Peace Support Operations (PSOs) is becoming more intense.

However, the financial costs of conducting PSOs is becoming increasingly unaffordable even for the developed countries, taking into account the global economic crisis. Besides the financial cost another factor that is affecting the nations' will to continue such operations is the loss of personnel due to IED incidents.

According to recent conclusions from PSO implementations in Iraq and Afghanistan, one thing that dramatically increases the number of casualties is the use of **Improvised Explosives Devises or IEDs.**

The term IED came into common usage during the Iraq War that began in 2003.

An Improvised Explosive Device (IED) is a "home-made" bomb or destructive device aimed to destroy, incapacitate, harass, or distract. IEDs are used by criminals, vandals, terrorists, suicide bombers, and insurgents. Because they are improvised, IEDs can come in many forms, ranging from a small pipe bomb to a "clever" and complicated device capable of causing massive damage and loss of life. IEDs can be carried or delivered in a vehicle, hand-carried or thrown by a person, delivered in a package or concealed on the roadside.

An IED can be almost anything with any type of material with explosive potential and initiator. It is a device that is designed to cause death or injury by using explosives alone or in combination with toxic chemicals, biological toxins, or radiological material. IEDs can be produced in various sizes and with a multitude of containers, functioning principles and delivery methods. IEDs can utilize commercial or military explosives, homemade explosives, or military ordnance and ordnance components.

They are unique in nature because the IED builder has to improvise with the materials at hand. Designed to defeat a specific target or type of target, they generally become more difficult to detect and protect against as they become more sophisticated.

IEDs fall into three categories:

- a. Package Type IEDs
- b. Vehicle-Borne IEDs (VBIEDs)
- c. Suicide Bomb IED

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Package-Type Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)

The insurgents in Iraq have used IEDs consisting of mortar and artillery projectiles as the explosive device. The most common explosives used are military munitions, usually 122 mm or greater mortar/tank/artillery rounds. The use and characteristics of these have included the following:

Emplaced along MSRs and alternate supply routes (targeting vehicles) - the most used and the most effective; Thrown from overpasses;

Thrown in front of approaching vehicles from roadside; Usually thrown by males-who are not always adults; Emplaced in potholes (covered with dirt);

Employed along unimproved roads (targeting patrols); Employed with 120-mm and larger artillery or mortar projectiles;

Found alone or in groups;

IEDs behind which are placed cinder blocks or piles of sand to direct blast into the kill zone;

Command detonated-either by wire or remote device; Time-delay triggered IEDs.

Vehicle Borne IEDs (VBIEDs)

Vehicle borne IEDs (VBIEDs) are devices that use a vehicle as the package or container of the device. These IEDs come in all shapes and sizes which vary by the type of vehicles available - small sedans to large cargo trucks.

Functioning of these devices can vary within the same methods as the package types and can have the same common characteristics or indicators as other IEDs

Suicide Bombs

A "person-borne" suicide bomb usually employs a highexplosive/fragmentary effect and uses a command detonation firing system, some sort of switch or button the bomber activates by hand.

A suicide bomber brings a particularly difficult threat for soldiers. The aim of the terrorist is not to commit suicide, but to kill or injure as many other soldiers and civilians as possible.

Paramilitary and terrorist groups have been building and detonating homemade bombs for years. That is because IEDs can be an effective strategy when facing a superior or



more technological military force. Guerilla fighters, rebels and terrorists employ the weapons mainly to harass the military and to terrorize civilians and governments. Their use shows no signs of abating.

One could fill volumes with all the IED attacks that have occurred within the last decade. In fact, roadside IEDs have reigned as the No. 1 killer of U.S. troops in Iraq. The number of U.S. casualties from roadside bombs in Afghanistan skyrocketed from 2009 to 2010. The number of U.S. troops killed by roadside bombs in Afghanistan soared by 60 percent in 2010, while the number of those wounded almost tripled. The figures also show that the number of those wounded by the roadside bombs in 2010 nearly tripled.

The **roadside bombs** are difficult to detect visually by soldiers both on foot and from vehicles. Even the specialized machines that run on the road can not easily identify these bombs as they investigate the main roads.

So, what should we do to protect ourselves?

The number one way to protect ourselves and others from an IED attack is to be alert to our surroundings. Advanced technologies help us detect possible dangers, but an even more effective tool is to encourage individuals to be alert for, and to report anything that is out of the ordinary in our daily routine. Examples include bags or boxes in unusual places, unusual smells, and suspicious behaviours such as someone dressed in a heavy coat in summer.

Some simple countermeasures that increase IED strike survivability include:

- Training (refresher) in first aid;
- Training in IED awareness;
- Wearing flak jackets;
- Riding on top of armoured vehicles when the tactical situation permits;
- Dissemination of information through intelligence channels.

If we are at the immediate site of an IED attack, our top priority is to get out of the area. This increases our safety in case a secondary device is present in the area and minimizes our exposure to dust, smoke, and any hazardous substances that may have been released as a result of the blast. This also allows emergency responders to find and assist the most critically injured victims.

Summarizing I would like to add that there is no safe method of protection from IED's, as reflected by the loss of personnel of countries whose armed forces have experience and advanced equipment.

Therefore, the foresight and good judgment are key factors to protect both human lives (primarily) and the equipment.

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Chief CG8 (BUDFIN) Captain Vassilios PAPAGEORGIOU

■ Economic Variations and Their Influence on SEEBRIG's Life

In every economy the desire for wellness and development presupposes stability in many sections of every day life, such as politics, finance and society.

The main purpose of the HQ is to contribute to regional security and stability and to foster a good lever of diplomatic relationships among the countries in South-Eastern Europe. As part of the global economy SEEBRIG is affected by the financial cycles more or less.

The question is what is the financial cycle? Is it a positive or a negative phenomenon?


DEFINITION

The Economic/Financial cycle is the phenomenon of repeated fluctuations in the level of general economic activity observed for a period of time.

Examining the economic activity for a period of time one can deduce that there are certainly some periods characterized by increasing income, employment and general rise in economic activity. This blossom is followed by periods with the opposite results - reduction in output, employment and general decline in economic activity.

The use of the word cycle does not mean necessarily periodicity or regularity in the appearance of the phenomenon nor that are all cycles identical. On the contrary, there are important differences both in their duration as well as in the intensity of their impact on the economy. The various phases or stages on the itinerary of the economy during the cycles are common features and are basically the same for all cycles.

An overview of the phases of the economic cycle is shown in the following diagram:





The two main phases that economy goes through during a business cycle are the growth phase and the descent phase. The transition from the growth phase to descent phase and vice versa is not immediate or quick and it requires a period of time. The transition from growth phase to descent phase passes through the phase of crisis that is the peak of the cycle. (points G, E). The transition from the descent phase to growth phase passes through the recession phase that is simply the bottom of the cycle. (points D, Z).

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PHASES

The most important features of the cycle are described below.

a) The recession phase

The recession (area around the bottom of D and Z) is characterized by extensive unemployment, lack of investment and insufficient demand for consumer goods. Production and income are at their lowest level. If prices do not decline, at least they remain at the same level, and corporate profits are low. Indeed, many companies may have losses rather than gains. The general business climate is not favourable to investment and there is pessimism about the future. Intensity of these factors varies from cycle to cycle. The more intense are the symptoms the deeper is the recession.

b) The growth phase

The recession will end sometime in the sense that something can happen to give a boost to the economy in order to start the upward spiral of the economy. That something can be either a technological progress that triggers investments or an increase in government spending. But regardless of the cause of the recession end, it leads to growth of aggregate demand, and this will lead to increased production, income and employment. With increasing aggregate demand, production, and increased profits a favourable climate for investment is created. But as total demand increases and with the increased employment of production factors, the first increases in prices will start to appear. The phase of growth in the above diagram is the region from point K to point G, point D to point E and point Z to point K'.

c) The crisis phase

The tendency for price increases will be more intense as the economy approaches the level of full employment. Now some "bottlenecks" begin to appear for certain categories of skilled work and shortages of certain basic raw materials. Generally, increasing production is difficult, cost increases and the increase in prices is now general. The economy is at the top of the cycle, the last stage of the

upward trend. At this stage the economy is more sensitive and more vulnerable to various factors that can halt the rise of the economy. (The area around the peak of G and E)

d) The descent phase

The phenomena observed at the descent phase are reduced consumption, stagnation or decline of the investments, decreases of income and employment. Many times the descent phase ends quickly when the economy resumes its upward trend relatively painlessly but sometimes it leads to a prolonged recession. (The area from point G to point D and from point E to point Z).

CAUSES OF BUSINESS CYCLES

The economists have developed several theories trying to understand and interpret the effect of fluctuations. Some of the theories give priority to external factors, such as inventions, wars or other political events. Still other theories emphasize on the factors that are coming through the economic system itself. In this category there are theories who consider the cycle a purely monetary phenomenon (the result of fluctuation in the money supply by the monetary authorities) and there are theories in favour of underconsumption or over-investment.

IMPACT ON THE FUNCTIONING OF SEEBRIG

All the above features of business cycles affect global economic activity. As part of the global economy, our Brigade can not remain unaffected. Budgets are reduced because of the crisis. The reduction of budget hampers important activities such as exercises and individual or collective training activities. This could reduce in the long term the operational readiness and the cohesion of the Brigade.

In order to upkeep SEEBRIG's motto "ONE TEAM ONE MISSION" and for the Brigade to continue its efforts for improvement, a secure and steady environment is considered necessary.

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LEGAD Clerk Master Sergeant Georgi KARADZHOV

The Non Commissioned Officer (NCO) - The Backbone of the Army

The NCO corps is often referred to as "the backbone" of the armed services, as they are the primary and most visible leaders for most military personnel. Additionally, they are the leaders primary responsible for executing a military organization's mission and for training military personnel so they are prepared to execute their mission. NCO training and education typically include leadership and management as well as service-specific and combat training.

Senior NCOs are considered the primary link between enlisted personnel and the commissioned officers in a military organization. Their advice and guidance is particularly important for junior officers, who begin their careers in a position of authority but generally lack practical experience.

The NCO corps usually includes all corporals and sergeants; in some countries, warrant officers also carry out the duties of NCOs. The naval equivalent includes some or all grades of petty officers, although not all navies class their petty officers as NCOs.

In all militaries, NCOs are easy to indentify by their rank insignia. The precise insignia used varies, depending on the branch of the military to which someone belongs and the nation which he or she serves.

There are different classes of NCOs, including junior NCOs (JNCO) and senior (or staff) NCOs (SNCO).

In most non-naval military organizations, the various grades of sergeants are NCOs ranking above privates and corporals, and below warrant officers and commissioned officers. The responsibilities of a sergeant differ from army to army. There are usually several ranks of sergeant, each corresponding to increasingly greater experience and responsibility for the daily lives of the soldiers in large units.

In medieval European usage, a sergeant was simply any attendant or officer with a protective duty. The etymology of the term is from Anglo-French sergeant, from Latin servient, serviens-to serve.

For the first time "Sergeant" was mentioned in the 11th century in England. At this time sergeants are described as particular farmers who served the Knights. In 12th cen-

tury's England sergeants were also called employees, who perform police functions. At a later stage "sergeant" would be used in the 15th century in France and then in the German and British Army. In the Middle Ages in Western mercenary and regular armies existed several sergeant positions:

- 1. Sergeant of the company
- 2. Sergeant of the regiment(or Sergeant Major) later became a Major
- 3. General Sergeant Major later renamed Major General

THE ROLE OF THE NCO

The overarching role of staff NCOs is to free up staff officers and enable them to make critical decisions in timely manner. Given that, people often assume that the primary function of NCOs in command and control nodes is to ensure that the generator is fueled and that the shift change occurs on time. Nothing could be farther from the truth or more harmful for efficient operations.

To help NCOs better understand their roles and responsibilities, they can refer to many doctrinal references, tactics, techniques and procedures; and combat training center lessons learned:

- 1. The fire team lieder-leads the soldiers.
- 2. The squad/Section Leader- he must take the initiative to keep his squad alert so the men are ready on short notice to move out on a mission.
- 3. The Platoon Sergeant- must know the platoon leader's job inside out and be prepared to take over the platoon
- 4. The First Sergeant-the role the |First Sergeant plays in the Company's mission is a significant factor for success.
- 5. Company training to division G-3, the Staff NCO is critical to a unit's success.
- 6. The Command Sergeant Major-The CSM is the "ram-rod" of the battalion. He makes sure things happen.



LEAD BY EXAMPLE

An NCO must lead by example and train his soldiers to a high level of proficiency and readiness in their team skills. An NCO's job is to get things done without having to be told first by a commissioned officer.

The NCO must think ahead at all times and not just sit and waits for things to happen. The team leader must know the squad leader's job and squad leader must know the platoon sergeant's job and so up the NCO channel. Also, the NCO must know the jobs of those soldiers under him. A good NCO must know his job and know it well. It's also critical they learn from the experienced senior NCOs and leaders in their units. Only a few soldiers have in the natural ability to be good leaders, most soldiers have to learn by constantly working on improving their leadership skills. It's critical they learn from the experienced senior NCOs and leaders in their unit. The NCO develops his leadership abilities and style by studying and applying both strengths and weaknesses of his leaders. It won't happen overnight, it takes constant dedication and work.

NCOs are the backbone of the Army and the reason why Armies work. As first-line supervisors they execute day-to-day operations with precision whenever and wherever duty calls but they also provide leadership required to fulfill a nonnegotiable contract - to fight and win wars decisively.

NCOs have to be able to fulfill a large variety of tasks-including CIMIC

NCOs are career military, just like their commissioned counterparts, and they may rise to their positions in a variety of ways. In some cases, they may join the military without the intent of reenlisting, and then become interested in long-term careers in the military which eventually puts them into a position as a sergeant or corporal. In other cases, they are trained in dedicated training schools without having previously been privates or enlisted men.

NCOs serve as liaison between commissioned officers and regular enlisted forces, for example keeping their superior officers informed about issues and situations which might be of relevance. This aspect of a NCO's role can be very important, as many militaries encourage an attitude of separation between officers and enlisted men which can make it difficult for officers to connect with service members in their command. NCOs also assist with a variety of administrative tasks, from filling out paperwork to assisting with scheduling.

NCOs can also offer commissioned officers valuable advice and training with the benefit of experience. Many commissioned officers do not have extensive experience when they arrive to take command, although they may be very well educated as a result of their officer training.

Therefore, having good non-commissioned officers to rely on is crucial, as they can help a commanding officer through the myriad of tasks involved in command.

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


Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR)
Sergeant Major Konstantinos KARAMPAS (Na-3)

The Honor to Support SEEBRIG

"Coming together is a beginning. Keeping together is progress. Working together is success."

- Henry Ford



A Moving HQ

Relocating an entire Brigade HQ as SEEBRIG from one country to another, is always a complex and time-consuming matter that requires skilled work and good preparation from all parties involved. Host Nation (Na-3) has made all the appropriate preparations and arrangements in order to be able to welcome and effectively support the Nucleus Staff of SEEBRIG and their dependents so that they can continue uninterrupted their life and work at their new home in Larissa.

Host Nation Support

According to MPFSEE agreement Na3 has allocated the required support units and personnel in order to meet its





obligations. The Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) is responsible for coordinating the Host Nation Support (Na-3) and for the establishment of liaison between SEEBRIG HQ with the military and political authorities. Additionally, Host Nation OPR provide assistance to SEEBRIG personnel in their transactions with public services such as solving custom issues, signing a contract with a utility company as well as registering for tax identification number and personal identification cards etc.

Facilities and Services

Two buildings of Camp "SCHINA" in Tirnavos Larissa were allocated to SEEBRIG HQ along with the requisite materials. Camp "SCHINA" is a High Military Standard compound which was also the base of JCSC until 2004 (a former NATO Command Structure HQ).

For the accommodation of SEEBRIG personnel new apartment houses including gym and playground were constructed in Larissa. All the apartments are fully furnished and equipped. The Host Nation also provides Hospital and medical/dental treatment, dispensary type medical service, emergency dental treatment and emergency, life-saving treatment in military hospitals to Nucleus Staff members and their dependents. SEEBRIG personnel and their dependants can benefit from military facilities such as Officers' Club and Commissary. Finally, in order to help SEEBRIG personnel familiarizing with their new environment, Host Nation OPR provides useful information to the SEEBRIG Nucleus Staff about the cultural events in the city of Larissa such as theaters, exhibitions, cinema movies, restaurants and orchestra performances.

Epilogue

SEEBRIG HQ has now a new home in the city of Larissa. Host Nation (Na-3) has the strong will for a constructive, qualitative and friendly cooperation with first priority the regional cooperation in consolidating peace and stability. Welcome SEEBRIG!



Chief CG5 (CIMIC) Major Daniel NATU (Na-6)

Fostering Partnerships and Cooperation

In the relatively short time since its relocation to Larissa, SEEBRIG HQ actively engaged in building partnerships and promoting cooperation with civilian and military high level representatives from Larissa area and beyond.

COMSEEBRIG and officers of SEEBRIG HQ visited the major military HQs and significant civilian authori-

ties in the area and also our barracks in Tyrnavos hosted high ranking political and military visitors in an endeavor of promoting our Public Diplomacy principles.

SEEBRIG HQ will continue to pursue a policy of openness and cooperation with multinational and Host Nation military and civilian authorities and organizations.









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Plans Officer (CIMIC) & Public Information Officer Major Nikolaos PSYRRAS (Na-3)

Social Activities of SEEBRIG HQ





























South-Eastern Europe Brigade "SEEBRIG"

Believing that cooperation and dialog among the countries of South-Eastern Europe must be further developed and considering their commitment to contribute to regional security and stability, and to foster good neighborly relations, among the countries, an Agreement on Multinational Peace Force South-Eastern Europe (MPFSEE) was signed by the Ministers of Defense of the seven participating countries in Skopje on 26 September 1998.

In accordance with MPFSEE Agreement, the South-Eastern Europe Brigade (SEEBRIG) was established and activated by seven participating Nations, on 31st of August 1999 in Plovdiv, Na-2 and was then hosted in Constanta, Na-6, then in Istanbul, Na-7 and is currently located in Tyrnavos (Larissa), Na-3. The current structure of the MPFSEE is a brigade-sized force of about 5000 troops and is known as South-Eastern Europe Brigade (SEEBRIG).

Units allocated to the SEEBRIG will remain at their permanent home base locations and will be committed under a task force principle for exercises and operations upon the decisions of the participating Nations and appropriate joint direction and coordination of the "Politico-Military Steering Committee (PMSC)".

In accordance of the provisions of the Agreement:

The Brigade will be declared to UN and OSCE. It will be available, commensurate with its capabilities, for employment in conflict prevention and in other peace support operations, including peace-keeping, peace-making, peace-building and humanitarian operations.

The force will be available for possible employment in UN or OSCE-mandated NATO-led or EU-led conflict prevention and other peace support operations. It could also participate in "coalition of the willing" type international initiatives. The Force will also function "within the sprit" of PfP.





WE ARE READY TO SUPPORT PEACE



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"ONE TEAM, ONE MISSION"