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2019

SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE BRIGADE REVIEW

MPFSEE

Handover - Takeover Ceremony
of SEDM-CC/PMSC Chairmanship

30th August 2019, Tyrnavos-Larissa/Na 3
Multinational Peace Force South-Eastern Europe

20th ANNIVERSARY of SEEBRIG

30th August 2019, Tyrnavos-Larissa/Na 3
Multinational Peace Force South-Eastern Europe
"ONE TEAM, ONE MISSION"

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"ONE TEAM, ONE MISSION"

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Brigadier General **Tudorică PETRACHE** (Na-6)
Commander of SEEBRIG

SEEBRIG – a unique structure

2019 was a special year for us. On 31st of August we celebrated 20 years since activation of South-Eastern Europe Brigade (SEEBRIG). From that historical moment, year by year, our brigade have become more mature by acquiring experience and valuable lessons learned. This structure is indeed unique and active in its dedication and willingness to promote regional security and stability.

Up to know, this year has been very busy, challenging and demanding. All our personnel were fully involved and committed to accomplish the planned tasks. It was for the first time in SEEBRIG's history that we participated in no less than 7 exercises in one year. Inside the magazine you will find details about all of them, along with other interesting articles which disseminates new ideas, concepts and lessons learned.

Full commitment

However, I would like to emphasize our main exercise for this year - Balkan Bridges 2019 which was organized in National Military Training Center "Charalitsa"/Na-2. SEEBRIG took part as Primary Training Audience (PTA) and the purpose of the exercise was to improve and enhance the interoperability between the members of Balkan CHODS (B9) Initiative Armed Forces and their capabilities to adequately apply NATO procedures and comprehensive approach to any security concerns

and risks related to a regional crisis in a joint environment. For us was an excellent opportunity to verify and review the SOPs in conducting Peace Support Operations, Disaster Relief Operations, Humanitarian Assistance. Moreover, as a newity, in the exercise participated another 3 SEDM member countries - Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia. The objectives of the exercise were achieved and the lessons identified will be very useful for future exercises, especially for Seven Stars 2020 which will take place next year in Na-5, after relocation of SEEBRIG HQ.

Strong visibility

Last year we included in the Annual Plan 2019 four high level visits. The intention was to increase SEEBRIG visibility and to extend the cooperation with NATO and non-NATO entities. We achieved this goal. We had very fruitful meetings with KFOR, OSCE, UN DPO and SHAPE HQ representatives.

The first visit we paid to KFOR HQ in March 2019 where we were informed about their mission in terms of PSOs challenges and other politico-military aspects in the area.

Next visit we conducted to OSCE High Level Planning Group (HLPG) in Vienna – Austria where we had a good opportunity to strengthen our cooperation, to get some fruitful insights for future exercises and workshops and to share lesson learned in the area of common interest. Also SEEBRIG delegation was welcomed to OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC)/Operations Service and received a briefing about the mandate, key tasks, operational outlook and their main activities. On top of that I had the privilege to meet NATO countries' ambassadors to OSCE, and to present them an information briefing about SEEBRIG background, mission, activities, challenges and way ahead.

In New York, we had constructive discussions with representatives from Office of Military Affairs/DPO and we exploited the occasion to reaffirm SEEBRIG availability of its capabilities in PSOs. Last planned activity was the visit to SHAPE HQ in Mons – Belgium where we met a team from Comprehensive Crisis and Operations Management Centre, an organization in charge with thinking, planning and acting strategically and comprehensively in multiple crises and operations simultaneously.

New challenges

Another achievement was an updated South-Eastern Europe Brigade Disaster Relief Operations Concept (SEEDRO). Previous concept was approved in 2009, but the growing dimension, frequency and complexity of disasters, and the increasing number of people affected, demands more complex capabilities for military and civil response as well as cooperation and coordination for efficiency into an integrated operation. New elements were added such as: reducing of Engineer Task Force (ETF) deployment time, establishing of an Operations Liaison & Reconnaissance Team (OLRT) from SEEBRIG HQ, affiliating First Responders Teams to SEEBRIG and enhancing ETF training for DROs. SEEDRO concept was approved during the last SEDM Meeting organized by Na-6 in October 2019 and the next step is to update the main planning documents and to enhance the training plan.

Looking forward

For the next year I am truly convinced that we will continue successfully achieving our tasks, as 2020 will be at least the same complex and challenging as 2019. Apart from yearly basis meetings at the politico-military level, we are planning to execute 6 exercises, 3 evaluation visits, 4 high level visits, 1 Key Leader Training, 5 courses, 1 study trip and other conferences, workshops and events.

We will continue to pursue our goal to increase the cooperation with NATO and non-NATO structures and organizations, by planning new bilateral meetings with two entities we had collaborated in the past - Regional Arms Control Verification and Implementation Assistance Centre (RACVIAC) and Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC).

A major challenge for next year will be the relocation in Na-5 in July 2020. We already had a recce visit in Skopje and Kumanovo in order to plan the next steps for a smooth transition without gaps and critical events.

In closing, I am convinced that with the outstanding support of the actual SEDM-CC/PMSC Chairmanship from Tirana, our member nations representatives and the commitment of our HQ personnel we will achieve our goals for the upcoming year.

I would like to congratulate the SEEBRIG personnel for the effort, ambition, dedication and at last but not the least the Host Nation representatives for their constant and immediate support.

I wish you a pleasant reading and another fruitful year in SEEBRIG community. **One team, one mission!**

Fostering Cooperation and Partnership

COL **Sotirios RIGOPOULOS**, (Na-3)
COS

Partnership is a term that can be implemented to the wide variety of inter-organizational forums where information and resources are shared and exchanged to produce outcomes that one partner working alone could not achieve. Sometimes it is beneficial to think of partnership as a process instead of outcome. If it is considered as a process, a feasible strategy that can maintain and improve this process need to be applied and adjusted so that desirable outcome can be achieved.

Desirable outcome can only achieved with promotion of SEEBRIG's profile, augmentation its visibility as a multinational organization. SEEBRIG is always to boost coordination and collaboration with international organizations which will be a source for our possible tasks. In this context, four high level visits were conducted for the first time in SEEBRIG history during the same year. In addition to high level visits, PMSC/SEDM-CC, DCHOD and SEDM meetings were participated by the delegation led by COMSEEBRING. Regarding high level visits and meetings:

1. KFOR HQ, 4-6 March 2019, Pristina

Firstly, SEEBRIG delegation paid a visit to KFOR which has been carrying out Peace Support Operationin the area of operation in 04-06 March in 2019. This was very beneficial for us to exchange information about operational aspects of PSO. Moreover, it has provided great opportunity for SEEBRIG delegation to discuss politico-military challenges in AOO and share experience and lesson learned during this activity. Augmentation of the cooperation between the SEEBRIG and KFOR and SEEBRIG visibility undoubtedly were the primary outcome from this High Level Visit.

2. OSCE, Vienna, 11-14 March 2019, Vienna/Austria

Secondly, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was visited by SEEBRIG delegation in 11-14 March 2019, Vienna/Austria. SEEBRIG delegation found the opportunity to have insights about key tasks, operational outlook and main activities of OSCE. Three major outcomes needs to be emphasized after this meeting. Firstly and fore mostly, we enhanced our mutual understanding and cooperation for future activities. Participation of SEEBRIG team to forum for security and cooperation in OSCE was a significant outcome of this high level visit. Furthermore, COMSEEBRIG found the opportunity to address all NATO member countries' ambassadors and explained the mission, aim and significance of SEEBRIG.

3. UN DPO HQ, 25-27 March 2019, New York/USA

After OSCE visit, UN HQ was visited by a SEEBRIG delegation. During this visit's potential aspects of coordination with Department of Peace Keeping Operations was investigated to observe strategic level process and procedures for a peacekeeping operation. Establishment of a sustainable coordination channel was with this HQ was the most important result for the visit. Additionally, SEEBRIG delegation found a chance to discuss possible cooperation in future exercises and have an insight of UN Planning and Force Generation Processes.

4. SHAPE, 01-03 April 2019, Mons/Belgium

 SEEBRIG delegation led by COMSEEBRIG visited NATO SHAPE HQ. This visit definitely increased our coordination with NATO and delved into the involvement of NATO Force structures as evaluators in SEEBRIG HQ. This visit was of great importance to show SEEBRIG's capabilities and increase its visibility in the region. SEEBRIG was ready to contribute NATO Crisis Response Operations. Sustainable coordination channel was established with the Comprehensive Crisis and Operational Management Centre (CCOMC). This visit provided an environment for discussion on strategic issues regarding SEEBRIG's future and on topics of mutual interest.

5. 41th PMSC and 40th SEDM-CC Meetings 18 - 21 March 2019, Crete, Na-3

41th PMSC, 40th SEDM-CC Meetings and the 1st SEEDRO Working Group of the SEDM Process, took place between 18 - 21 March 2019 in Chania, Crete, Na-3. Representatives from 12 SEDM Nations, the SEEBRIG Commander BG Tudorică PETRACHE and an observer from RACVIAC participated in the meetings. During the meeting, the SEEBRIG Commander presented a briefing about SEEBRIG's main activities since the last PMSC meeting and the future financial and personal activities. Moreover, other various programs, initiatives, concepts and proposals were discussed in friendly spirit and mutual understanding.

6. SEDM Deputy Chiefs of Defence Meeting (DCHOD), 12 June 2019, Skopje/Na 5.

On 12th of June 2019, COMSEEBRIG participated in the SEDM DCHOD which took place in Skopje/Na-5. The senior representatives of SEDM Nations highly appreciated the SEEBRIG activities and its commitment to peace, stability and cooperation in the region. Moreover, during the meeting, the 6th Additional Protocol of the MPFSEE Agreement was signed by the SEDM Deputy Chiefs of Defense, who repeated strongly their support to SEDM activities.

7. 42nd PMSC and 41st SEDM-CC Meetings 17-19 September 2019, Tirana/Na-1

The 42nd PMSC and 41st SEDM-CC Meetings were held from 17th to 19th September 2019, for the first time under Albanian Chairmanship, in Tirana/Na-1. The SEDM nations, the SEEBRIG delegation led by COMSEEBRIG BG Tudorică PETRACHE and a representative from RACVIAC participated in the meetings. During the 42nd PMSC meeting, the SEEBRIG Commander presented a briefing with a summary of the SEEBRIG's activities from the last PMSC meeting, future activities, Annual Plan 2020, Budget Plan 2020, Medium Term Financial Plan 2020-2022, Action Plan regarding auditors observations, the new SEEDRO Concept and manning issues.

8. SEDM Ministerial Meeting, 16 October 19, Bucharest

Ministers and representatives from SEDM Nations, the SEEBRIG Commander and observers from NATO HQ, UN Office in Belgrade, RACVIAC – Centre for Security Cooperation, and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP/SEESAC) participated in the meeting chaired by H.E. Petro KOCI. They focused on promoting enduring peace, stability and security in the region of Southeastern Europe (SEE) as well as the achievements of SEDM process.

During the SEDM meeting, the SEEBRIG Commander BG Tudorică PETRACHE presented a summary of the SEEBRIG's main activities since the last Ministerial Meeting in Belgrade, future activities, SEEBRIG's documents pending for approval and other issues.

MPFSEE Ministers of Defense approved the HQ SEEBRIG Annual Plan for 2020, SEEBRIG's Budget for the Fiscal Year 2020, the Medium Term Financial Plan 2020-2022, HQ SEEBRIG Action Plan Regarding Auditors Observations and the SOP 801 Amendments (Financial Administrative Procedures for Multinational Financing) and the new SEEDRO Concept.

Consequently, we had a fruitful period in 2019 in which SEEBRIG has promoted the Brigade as an active entity within the international security environment. The following 2020 will continue to be a very challenging and demanding year. First because SEEBRIG faces its relocation in the vicinity of KUMANOVO/Na-5 which will be a great challenge not only for the staff but for the SEDM initiative too. At the same time in the framework of the aforementioned exacting Annual Plan the continuance cooperation and partnership will be achieved with international actors by their participation in SEVEN STARS 20 with which we will strengthen the SEEBRIG's position in the region.

On the other hand with the knowledge, experience and confidence gathered so far, SEEBRIG in 2020 is going to continue to promote and enhance its high profile and visibility in international environment as well by conducting high level visits with OSCE, RACVIAC, EADRCC and SHAPE.

Exercise and Training Approach

COL **Murat VURAL**, (Na-7)
DCOSOPS

South Eastern Europe Brigade (SEEBRIG) was established to promote regional stability and security, foster political trust and develop cooperation among the countries as a tool of South Eastern Defense Ministerial (SEDM) Process. The primary function of SEEBRIG is to enhance the capacity and vigilance of its nucleus staff for the potential employment in UN or OSCE-mandated NATO-led peace support operations. As operational requirements and missions evolve, SEEBRIG must remain ready, responsive, adaptable and interoperable. Within this context, "Exercise and Training Approach" can be considered as the most important component for the achievement of SEEBRIG readiness for potential future mission. This approach bases on:

1. Individual Training
2. Collective Training and Courses
3. Exercises
4. Exercise Planning and Conducting
5. Evaluation Visits

1. Individual Training

With individual training, SEEBRIG aims to develop the skills and knowledge necessary to perform specific duties and tasks, maintain level of mastery on NATO, SEEBRIG procedures, improvement of the language skills of the nucleus staff. Physical Training, First Aid Training, Newcomers Training and Host Nation Language Courses were the inseparable components of the Individual Training, conducted in 2019. These trainings aimed to increase practical skills and cognition of the nucleus staff. Moreover, SEEBRIG HQ personnel during the assignment in SEEBRIG HQ are to attend courses related to Peace Support Operations. Accordingly, 10 personnel took place in 1-2 weeks individual courses in NATO School-Oberammergau such as NATO European Security and Cooperation Course, NATO Information Knowledge Management Course and Exercise Planning Process courses. These courses enlightened both the participants and the nucleus staff via debriefings of attendees about various topics.

2.   Collective Training and Courses

Collective training focus on practical application of doctrine, plans and procedures to acquire and maintain collective, tactical and operational capabilities. During the last year several collective trainings were conducted in SEEBRIG HQ, provided by mobile training teams from PfP Training Centers, NATO HQs and local entities. For instance, Crisis Management Course, Human Intelligence Course, Crisis Communication Course were successfully conducted with the participation of all SEEBRIG HQ staff.

Additionally, Key Leader Training was conducted on a yearly basis in the SEEBRIG HQ to train subordinate units' commanders and to enhance coordination between nucleus staff and units. This training also provided the commanders to get acquainted with nucleus staff and discuss future activities of SEEBRIG.

3.   Exercises

Training is an essential tool to achieve an appropriate standard of proficiency for SEEBRIG units and staffs through the integration of experiences gathered in real missions, exercises and staff studies. It supports the assessment and development of military concepts and capabilities. Moreover, the exercises as a part of the SEEBRIG's training aspects prepare the SEEBRIG staff for all PSO in a multinational environment. Therefore, exercises are one of the SEEBRIG's top priorities because they are fundamental to combat PSO readiness.

By participating in exercises, SEEBRIG personnel has experienced how exercise planning process was conducted and investigated some potential ways to adapt specific outcomes for its future exercises. In this regard, Cooperative Resolve, Valiant Jackal, Saber Guardian, Gordian Knot, Maple Arch and Eurasian Star 2019 were the exercises which were participated as either augmentees or response cell by nucleus staff in 2019.

Throughout its history, SEEBRIG attended many exercises performed by other international HQs. The number of exercises that SEEBRIG is attending is increasing year by year. Within this context, the number of exercises and training activities that SEEBRIG attends has been increasing year by year for the last 20 years. For instance; while the number of the participants to exercises in 2003 was 3 officers and 3 NCOs, this number has increased to 27 officers and 10 NCOs for the last year.

4.   Exercise Planning and Conducting

Furthermore, Balkan Bridge 2019 (BB19) was the most important exercise and represented the training milestone event for SEEBRIG in this year. This two level, tactical and distributed Command Post Exercise (Computer Assisted Exercise)was the one in which SEEBRIG HQ took part for the first time in its history as MNBDE A and primary training audience. SEEBRIG personnel with augmentees found a great opportunity to test and develop its SOPs, training objectives and South Eastern European Exercise and Training

Network. Consequently, SEEBRIG proved its ability to rapidly integrate augmentees in order to conduct its assigned mission related to PSO&DRO in highly professional manner. The objectives of the exercise have been achieved and it vividly demonstrated that SEEBRIG is ready to achieve future missions.

5.   Evaluation Visits

In addition to the aforementioned activities, three evaluation visits to the units allocated to SEEBRIG were conducted with the aim to monitor and supervise organizational, operational, and personnel capabilities with the evaluation teams. Eligible units to be included in the program are all types of Battalion, and independent Company and Platoon sized land force elements, subordinate to SEEBRIG.

Evaluation visits executed in Na-3, 5 and 7 in 2019 furnished COMSEEBRIG to assess the ability of the units and provide the highest degree of standardization in SEEBRIG community. They also supplied COM-SEEBRIG to directly interact with high level officials and military staff of member nations.

As we are about to complete 2019 with great achievements, 2020 is expected to be a challenging year which will bring new responsibilities for SEEBRIG personnel. Not only nucleus staff will dedicate themselves to accomplish objectives of five exercises including milestone event SEVEN STAR 2020, but also they will be occupied with liabilities which the relocation to NA-5 can initiate. Moreover, five collective courses, three evaluation visits and a study trip as integral parts of training and exercise approach will be executed for the next year. These activities definitely will require great effort, eagerness and commitment.

However, SEEBRIG personnel, with their diligent work and dedication, is going to cope with all assigned tasks and projects in a highly professional manner with close contact and coordination with UN, NATO and EU structures. This is the only way that SEEBRIG's dove of peace continues to fly higher in the sky.

Relocation of SEEBRIG HQ

COL **Vladimir STOJANOVSKI**, (Na-5)
DCOSSUP

Introduction

Changing the place of living and place of work is a well-known category in our military life. For us soldiers, this is a regular activity. But, during those relocations, our families bear the same burden with us. Perhaps, for them, this is a more stressful event because they are not trained like us. One thing is for sure, as soldiers we must always be ready to accept changes. Moving SEEBRIG headquarters not often happen. For 20 years of existence of our HQ, relocation was carried out 3 times. At the moment we are on the planning process of the fourth relocation from Larissa to Kumanovo.

Beginning and planning of Relocation

The first step in the relocation process is the clearly articulated willingness of one of the SEEBRIG country to host the headquarters. That intent must be expressed as early as possible to initiate the relocation promptly.

Three parties are actively involved in the planning of relocation. The existing host country is the first side, while the second side is the new host country. The third-party and driver of relocation is the SEEBRIG headquarter.

SEEBRIG members need to understand that the new place of work cannot be compared with the existing one. Starting from the political system of the new receiving country and ending with the cultural and environmental conditions, we shouldn't expect to same conditions as in the present country. It is time for a change; it is time for new challenges.

Other SEEBRIG member states are not only observers in the process, but on the contrary, they should be very much interested in the development. They should be active in following the status of their representatives, particularly in the areas of accommodation and education.

It is very important to mention that during relocation from one to another country a significant number of SEEBRIG personnel will be replaced. In practice, people who will not be subject to relocation need to set up conditions for others to

come. This will require a high degree of professionalism and dedication to service from people who are leaving our unit. The planning process is a joint project which involves a new host country, SEEBRIG HQ and a current host country. All are included. Given that the SEEBRIG headquarters is the body to move, the biggest burden is on them.

The main procedure in the planning process is to generate a Road Map for Relocation. This document should encompass all phases of activity, starting from the very beginning and ending with the last task in the new location. Times for certain activities have to be as accurate as possible. It is obligatory to share the Road Map with the future hosts.

The first document from SEEBRIG HQ to New Host nation is a Statement of requirements. This document encompasses the most important issues regarding location, transportation, security, accommodation area; CIS and overall Host nation support in new headquarter.

Visits
To provide general visibility of conditions in a new place, at a minimum, three reconnaissance visits should be performed.

During the first visit, the SEEBRIG team should take a look in a new place of HQ, establish contact with New HN point of contact in all necessary areas and examine possibilities in the area of accommodation and education.

The second visit is in its nature completely different than the first one. Of course, agreed points from the first visit should be checked and confirmed. Before this visit, is very important that future HN has determined Officer with primary responsibilities (OPR) with the necessary staff around him/

her. The main issues that should be assessed are issues of tax exception, residence permit, car registration and medical support of personnel.

Third and final recce ought to be a checklist of jobs already done. No or few marginal issues should be left for resolving for this visit. In the hearth of the third visit are final agreements for exact dates of arrival of SEEBRIG Advanced party and set up final conditions for housing.

From reality to the future

Execution of relocation

Actual work on relocation starts after the first visit. SEEBRIG Sections need to prepare their equipment for relocation and to calculate needed space and approximate weigh. This activity is important to allow to G4 section to open procedures for transportation issues. This will include inventory check and write-off of the equipment which is not in use.

Approximately one month before the relocation of the main SEEBRIG body, the Advance team should be deployed in New HQ. The core task for this team is to establish and put in operation SEEBRIG CIS assets. Also, one part of the team will work on the final preparation of the residential area in terms of preparing conditions for the movement of family members.

Legal issues are important to solve custom procedures for export/import SEEBRIG common property. The main effort should lie down on LEGAD and New HN OPR.

Financial support also should be resolved before relocation. Newly appointed Chief of Staff and Budget officer (CG8) will need to cooperate to provide smooth transfer of bank accounts from one country to another.

As an ending activity in old HN, both for SEEBRIG HQ and accommodation area, contracts for utilities have to be paid and business closed.

Thanks for Old and opening a New Headquarter

It is important to mention that the Farewell ceremony must be organized in an Old HQ as a gesture to express thank you for years of support and mutual efforts.

Opening the SEEBRIG headquarter in the new Host nation is a time for celebration. The activation ceremony is the last activity in the overall Relocation process and should be organized before the actual relocation. This is a challenging operation for both SEEBRIG and new hosts working together on details on a distance.

Role Of Political Counselor In Peace Support Operations (PSOs)

LTC **Florenc MIHALI**, (Na-1)
POLAD

"From my experience, the best advisors help in three ways: encourage you to look at the problem or opportunity from multiple angles; help you balance the tug of the short-term with important long-term priorities; and ask the tough questions you need to know to reach the best solution".
- *Margo Georgiadis, American Businesswoman*

"We need someone with superb judgment in their own right because, yes, a president can hire the best advisors on Earth, but I guarantee you this: Five advisors will give five different opinions. And it is the president - and the president alone - who always makes the final call".
-*Michelle Obama, American First Lady*

During the execution of Peace Support Operations (PSO) the political adviser plays an important role. Based on the fact that PSOs are conducted in highly politicized environments, Commanders of Force needed Political Advisers (POLAD) to advise on the political implications of military operations, to help in interpreting the local political developments, and to maintain contacts with the host government. As PSOs became more complex and took on more civilian tasks supporting the peace processes, political issues became essential, requiring the need for POLAD to be an integral part of the operations. The role of POLAD can vary considerably depending on the mission. The mission's mandate and political role are crucial factors that determine the role and duties of POLAD. There are a number of tasks that are typical of POLAD's work in peace support operations that form the core of its activities.

1. Counseling

The core task of POLAD is to provide counseling. Good judgment on political matters is the foundation of good advice. Political judgment is about understanding what "works" in politics. It has more to do with intuition and common sense than with knowledge and expertise. For effective advice, POLAD must be based on reliable, up-to-date information and a strong understanding of the situation at hand. It should be based on accurate information and detailed analysis. If this is not possible, it should be open to uncertainties rather than making assumptions that may be wrong, but should always keep in mind that the advices be in line with the mandate, objectives and mission tools, as well as in a larger strategic context. To provide the right advice, there are certain aspects to be considered like studying the essence of the issue that requires political action, analyzing the actions that might be taken to achieve the required goal, and defining the possible ways and actions to be executed.

Identifying the risks involved, is always useful for tracking different options. POLAD is responsible for the internal advices but the primary responsibility for the consequences of an operation remains to the Operation Commander, who must be able to value the risks out of profits when taking a decision.

2. General functions of POLAD.

In terms of activity and scope, POLAD's main functions are divided into four main directions: up, down, in and out.

2.1. Upwards function

The High function includes supporting the Commander of the military force by providing advice on political matters. These advices mainly deal with the political part of the mandate, but the field of counseling may be broader and can relate to other aspects of mission activities. Human rights, humanitarian aid and development assistance can be deeply political areas. Whereas technical and administrative issues may be of political importance, depending on the context. Most of POLAD's advices relate to tactical issues that arise every day during the PSO, such as the messages that convey in a speech or how to handle a particular meeting. Counseling may also have to do with more strategic and long-term policy issues, such as the general way to handle a conflict or design a mediation process. The activity of POLAD, in particular for field missions, largely involves local politics.

2.2. Downwards function

The downwards function includes contacts with the rest of the mission. This may include providing political advice to the commanders of the subordinate units while acting also as a coordinator between the Operation Commander and his subordinates. The latter can be especially important in large and complex peace operations, where the Operation Commander is not able to have much direct contact with all commanders in operation. In smaller political missions, such as the Office of the Special Envoys or the Representatives, this function tends to be less important.

Consulting subordinate structures can translate the commander's strategic vision into operational guidance for mission members.

2.3. Outwards Activity Function

The external function is related to the pursuit and implementation of foreign policy by engaging with external interlocutors on behalf of the PSO Commander. This activity may include operational activities, supporting mediation efforts between the parties or negotiating with the host government. POLAD usually participates and supports political dialogue with local and international contacts. The purpose of this engagement is mainly to convey and receive messages, exchange opinions, defend policies and positions, and provide information about local developments.

POLAD
Inwards function

OPERATION COMMANDER

POLAD

HQ

Theatre of Operation

2.4. Inwards Activity Function

The internal function consists of managing the relationship between the Operation Commander and the staff emphasized in the multinational staffs. This is primarily a coordination task but may also include promoting mission interests at headquarters. This requires the ability to navigate the often tricky domestic policy of the staff and maintain an ongoing dialogue on policy issues.

3. Special functions of POLAD.

POLAD reports directly to the Operation Commander by establishing and maintaining lines of communication between political and military actors in the area of operation, assisting in translating the political objectives of the mandate into field military objectives and monitoring and reporting on the status of their implementation.

For the above, POLAD has a special role and other functions such as:

• Negotiation and liaison;
• Monitoring and reporting on developments;
• Coordination; and
• Research, analysis and policy planning.

3.1. Negotiation and liaison.

POLAD establishes and maintains key mission contacts with conflicting parties by gathering information, resolving disputes, and answering questions. Where no agreement exists, or the agreements or subsidiary protocols that need to be mediated have terminated, POLAD assumes additional responsibility in supporting Operation Commander during the negotiation processes by interacting with other stakeholders. During the negotiations, POLAD decides on the basic principles of the agreement, rules and procedures for discussion and decision-making, participation and methods of representation, evaluation of preconditions and barriers, creating a equal playing for the parties, determining the sources for the negotiations, determining the place, form and the timing of the talks, facilitating the communication and exchange of information, including the level of confidentiality, as well as defining forms of third-party intervention.

3.2. Monitoring and reporting.

In order to provide a detailed and accurate analysis of the status of the implementation of the mandate and the cooperation between the parties to the conflict, POLAD must provide comprehensive knowledge about the general situation in the PSO area. They constantly review and evaluate political developments as well as security, humanitarian and economic developments. The commander can split his monitoring responsibilities by assigning POLAD to focus on specific aspects such as humanitarian activities or sub-regional developments. POLAD's monitoring role goes beyond the mission area to study developments that may affect the peace process. Sharing information from the smallest unit to the Operation Commander and up to the Headquarters of the Mission is essential to the success of any operation, because the Headquarters has a broader knowledge of the international community's priorities and concerns.

3.3. Coordination in mission.

POLAD play an important coordinating role within the mission. They coordinate the activity of military forces with those of other actors under the headquarters operating on the ground. POLAD's coordination function ensures that headquarters reporting reflects the integrated approach required by multidimensional operations and that other actors involved in the operation do not provide repetitive or conflicting information.

3.4. Political analysis and policy planning.

POLAD is responsible for evaluating how the mandate of a multidimensional operation can be achieved under specific field conditions. This requires an analysis of all the political factors and not only political factors affecting the peace process, the level of cooperation from the parties to the conflict, and the incentives and discourses available to the international community in encouraging compliance with the agreements reached. An important element of this task is the identification of key political players in the peace process, which may include, in addition to conflicting parties, influential persons (elders), religious leaders, civil society groups, and external actors. This enables POLAD to plan the strategy for the realization of its mission and peace process.

4. Challenges of Political Advisers.

Based on the fact that POLAD is in operation and very close to developments, in tense or highly politicized environments can often be in the midst of controversy.

Often conflicting parties try to convince their interlocutors that they are innocently and that the other party is completely at fault, and any fair and critical judgment of POLAD's attitude often leads to allegations of bias.

Another challenge for Political Advisors is that they are often required to provide creative solutions to the problems they face, both within the mission and beyond the strictly political arena.

Often the demands of the conflicting parties are staggering. This is another challenge for political advisers who need to be agile and flexible to handle the situation.

For this article are used:
    1.   "Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations" publication of the Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit/Department of Peacekeeping Operations.
    2.   "The political adviser's handbook" Author: Fredrik Wesslau, Folke Bernadotte Academy

Commanders' role in Military Lessons Learned System (LLS)

LTC **Atanas LEFTEROV**, (Na-2)
CG1

The article presents the architecture of the Lessons Learned (LL) capabilities, the commander's role in the LL Process (LLP) as well as in fostering LL organization culture.
The paper is based on multiple case study analysis within NATO (only unclassified sources).

Introduction

To command in wartime is to assume responsibility for taking and saving human lives. To command in peace and war is to direct how human beings will conduct themselves towards each other. As such, the commander sets moral standards and sees that they are obeyed. To command, therefore, is to think and decide, to feel and moralize, to act and wield power.

Paraphrasing the words above it can be said that a commander will be successful in employing knowledge and saving human lives only if he/she is able to learn from the past and present conflicts and operations.

The fundamental idea of LLS is to improve performance, either through prevention or avoidance of mistakes, or replication of new successful methods. Military capabilities are developed through building functional components including: doctrine, organization, training, material, personnel, leadership, facilities and interoperability (DOTMPLFI).

As regards of leadership there are three functions performed by military commanders for the benefit of LLS: guidance, engagement and promotion. Cooperation, communication and coordination are among the core guiding principles.

Some authors identify two categories of the antecedents of LLS' effectiveness. The first one includes: structures, procedures, manuals and IT tools supporting LLP. The involvement of commanders, soldiers and civilian employees is listed as the second determinant while positive leadership is considered to be the prerequisite of these positive behaviors.

Lessons Learned System

LL CAPABILITY

The term LL is holistically used to describe people, things and activities related to the act of learning from experience to achieve improvements. The LLS consists of collection, analysis, dissemination, and archiving of observations, insights, lessons and

"best practices" garnered from military training, exercises, and operations. The principal aim is to support commanders in the process of improving the warfighting capabilities of their forces. However, it should be noticed that a lesson is not learned until there are tangible changes in the way an organization, a unit or any other entity operates. Therefore, discussing the LLS there is a need to make a clear distinction between observations, lessons identified (LI) and LL. A lessons is learned only when it is embedded and then applied. Unlike LL, observations or LI themselves cannot be associated with an improved capability or increased performance.

According to the approach adopted in NATO "LL is an improved capability or increased performance confirmed by validation when necessary resulting from the implementation of one or more remedial actions for a LI".

The NATO LL Capability (LLC) consists of three fundamental pillars: structure, process and tools. The commander is "equipped" with a capability to capture, analyze and take remedial action on any issue and to communicate and share results to achieve improvement. In NATO, a great emphasis is placed on the assumption that everyone within an organization is involved in LLP and contributes to the LL capability. However, the LL capability is equally dependent on all the following factors: the engagement of leaders, positive mindset, willingness to share information and stakeholders' involvement.

Nevertheless, the biggest challenge to the LLS is the fact that at the tactical level (with few exceptions) there is lack of LL full-time personnel and the system is managed by dual-hated officers, who have to split their effort into conducting duties stated in job descriptions and as LL officers.

The commander's role in the LLP

Commanders at each level have a vital role to play in ensuring that lessons are learned in support of the improvement of operations. This includes establishing the LL mindset across their commands, setting expectations for subordinates in the gathering and analysis of observations, tasking remedial action bodies and following up on that tasking to ensure lessons have been learned by those under their command who need to learn them.

The organizational leadership must provide priorities at all the stages of the LLP to guide command and analysts' attention focus. This focus direction requires selecting the crucial areas of observation, and screening the resulting observations for those issues worthy of further analysis. It is not possible to holistically deal with each dimension of every issue –prioritization of effort is vital and must include not only prioritizing issues to observe, but also the scope and the type of implementation activities. In setting those priorities, the commander must provide guidance as to:

- In what areas observations are vital to the command;
- what resources can be dedicated to LI to implement them;
- what external organizations should be approached to facilitate the LI implementation if it is beyond the resources of the organization;
- how the remedial actions should be executed;
- how the remedial actions should be validated once they have generated the desired effects;
- what degree of effort should be dedicated to the issue;
- what aspects of the recommended remedial actions are necessary and what aspects are of secondary importance.

Leaders at each level of command must explain, through, for example command directives or SOPs, what they want their staffs to do in regard to LL.

Commanders at the tactical level must provide their subordinates with clear guidance on what kind of observations, where and when they should collect them. Commanders should create favorable conditions for the collection of observations.

One of the most important tools they have at their disposal is the After Action Review (AAR) process. What makes the Army's learning system most effective is the AAR during and immediately after an event, applying what is learned as quickly as possible back into action.

However, it would not have been possible if the commanders had not created an atmosphere conducive to sharing information during AAR.

The emphasis should be on the application rather than the collection of observations. The quantity of observations does not necessarily translate into the quality of them – unless observations are "best practices" or become LL they cannot be used to include in the process of developing new doctrines.

One of the most common misconceptions about LL among some commanders is the direct association of the LLP with evaluation and assessment processes. If LLS is perceived by commanders as part of evaluation, it will have a very negative impact on their subordinates. In such a situation, it is "against the interests" of the subordinates to share observations and lessons as it may lead to a lower grade. Commanders, thanks to the familiarization with LL ideas, should understand that while evaluation is concerned with grading performance, the LLP is concerned only with improving performance.

As a result of this awareness, the knowledge gained from LLS can be placed in the foreground and the mistakes and the people who made them, can remain in the background.

Leadership support is critical in the endorsement of the remedial action and tasking of the action body. Without command direction on the remedial action and action body, the lesson will likely stall in the LLP as the organization will fail to complete the action necessary to 'institutionalize' the learning. The leadership should take ownership of the 'business case'.

Once endorsement and tasking is complete, it is time for implementation and monitoring of the remedial action. The action body tasked with the remedial action should develop a remedial action plan for implementation. The leadership should monitor the key milestones to measure success of the remedial action plan implementation. Leadership engagement greatly mitigates these risks.

Where leadership engagement is good, identified remedial action implementation is not lost in the shuffle of the daily business and thus falls behind schedule until the LI becomes useless.

The commander's role in fostering LL

While all the military and civilian personnel should be engaged in the LL activities, the successful implementation and functioning of LL is especially dependent on the awareness and engagement of the command leadership. The LLP is time, effort and resources consuming. Therefore the commanders' engagement and support are indispensable for its success. Only when commanders give top priority and personally engage in the LL business, the process can get the right momentum". Leadership is essential to foster an organizational culture that not only accepts the need for the organization self-examination that underpins a successful LLP, but embraces it. Strong leadership engagement in LL activities will enable the command to apply the knowledge from their own experiences and the experiences of the others to significantly improve mission accomplishment. Experiences from recent operations and research show that the essential difference between working and not working LLS is leadership engagement. Thus the role of the commander is to create a culture promoting the behaviors of reapplying lessons. The good commander creates a favorable climate in which there is not only a willingness to share but also a willingness to learn. He himself takes the lead in that willingness to learn.

Leadership is the determining factor in a LLP as it is often personality driven because of the commander's engagement and support. Most often it is the commanders' own choice which resources are dedicated to a LLP.

The role of the commander is also to dispel the misconception that LL are a bureaucratic step in the conclusion of an operation or exercise, rather than a vital step in the preparation and planning of the next operation or exercise.

The commanders should realize and make their subordinates aware that knowledge itself does not change behavior. It needs to be applied to be of value. A commander should also be able to see the difference between those problems that are the result of mere negligence, human error or violation of the regulations and those observations that constitute a systemic problem and have the potential to become LL worth sharing. What is even more important, commanders should understand that unsolved problems will recur at a later stage of their careers with even more severe consequences.

Commanders should not only be aware of the LLS, but should also promote the proper attitude towards LL among their subordinates. While self-assured the commanders should not create the aura of own infallibility because it will discourage their subordinates from sharing with them their doubts and observations. Besides, incentives are required to motivate action, and therefore appropriate incentive creation is a vital aspect of leader's promotion of the LLC as a tool for organizational improvement. Positive incentives are necessary in order to overcome natural resistance to sharing deficiencies. Subordinates should know that their actions taken in the area of LL not only serve the common good but also are appreciated and rewarded by a commander. What is more, establishing incentives is extremely important to overcome the human, psychological resistance to externalise own problems and deficiencies and motivate human behaviors favorable for learning, sharing knowledge and introducing changes.

Conclusion

The traditional measure of leadership comes down to the question whether an organization performed its tasks, fulfilled its obligations, and accomplished its missions. However, these are all short-term goals.

Long-range leadership means that leaders are not preoccupied with perfection and short-term goals that look good but have little impact on improving the organisation. Leaders must work to build a climate that encourages pruden risk taking and creativity, exercises command that tolerates honest mistakes, promotes learning and sharing lessons and good practices.

By providing the guidance for observation, prioritization of implementation activities and creation of the incentives for subordinates to enthusiastically participate in the LLP, leaders play an essential role to ensure the resources expended on the LLC provide a worthwhile return on investment or we are focused on LL not as an aim in itself, but as a means to improve mission's accomplishment.

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Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) for Humanitarian Assistance Operation

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G2 Clerk

Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) is not a uniquely modern idea. The writing's of Sun Tzu (403-221 BC) include weather and terrain among five criteria by which to appraise a situation in order to gauge the outcome of war. Sun Tzu also stresses the importance of foreknowledge --intelligence-- about the enemy situation. "Intelligence" Sun Tzu states, "is the essence of warfare --it is what armies depend upon in their every move."

According to FM 34-130, "IPB is a systematic, continuous process of analyzing the threat and the environment in a specific geographic area. It is designed to support staff estimates and military decision making." IPB is supposed accomplish two objectives to assist the commander:

1. Determine the threat's likely course of action;
2. Describe the environment and its effects. These objectives, according to FM 34-130, may be accomplished by following four steps:

    a.   Define the battlefield environment
    b.   Describe the battlefield's effects
    c.   Evaluate the threat
    d.   Determine threat courses of action

1. DEFINE THE BATTLEFIELD ENVIRONMENT

2. DESCRIBE THE BATTLEFIELD'S EFFECTS

IPB

4. DETERMINE THREAT COURSES OF ACTION

3. EVALUATE THE THREAT

Each of these steps results in products that the commander may use in making decisions. The manual places considerable emphasis on attempting to make the products graphic. The key graphical products include situation templates and decision support templates. The purpose of those templates is to convey a great deal of information about the enemy in a concise, visual form that supports the friendly commander's decision making. Situation templates depict threat dispositions, based on threat doctrine and the effects of the battlefield. Prominent time phase lines depict the flow of the operation. A decision support template becomes the graphic record of the war gaming process. It depicts points in space and time called decision points, as well as other important information required to execute a specific friendly course of action.

Each step of the IPB process also involves implicit and explicit assumptions. A detailed explanation of the steps of IPB serves to highlight the products and the assumptions in the process.

Define the battlefield environment (Step 1)

This step involves identifying the important aspects of the battlefield in order to focus the intelligence collection effort. Two areas acquire definition here. The first definition relates to the "area of interest" --a geographic area "from which information and intelligence are required to permit planning or successful conduct of the command's operation. The second definition for the "area of operations" is usually assigned by a unit's higher command, or is determined through coordination of the intelligence officer, the operations officer, and the commander. The areas of operation and interest are usually portrayed graphically on a map.

Describe the battlefield's effects (Step 2)

This step involves evaluation of the effects of the battlefield on both the friendly and enemy actions. The intelligence officer "identifies the limitations and opportunities the environment offers on the potential operations of friendly and threat forces." Consideration of terrain and weather are always part of an environmental assessment, but may also include other characteristics.

Evaluate the threat (Step 3)

Here an analysis of the intelligence holdings is supposed to aid in determining how the threat normally organizes for and conducts combat operations. The product of this step is a threat model. The model's graphic form is doctrinal templates. The purpose of the templates is to depict "how the threat operates when unconstrained by the effects of the battlefield environment."

Determine threat courses of action (Step 4)

This step relies on the previous three steps as a basis to form a conclusion about what the threat is most likely to do. The products of step four are predictions. In graphic form they are depiction on a map of how the threat will array physically on the ground at given points in time.

These predictions are not possible without the intelligence officer insuring that he or she has:

- Adequately analyzed the friendly mission throughout the time duration of the operation; identified the physical limits of the AO and AI; and identified every characteristic of the battlefield environment that might affect the operation (step1).
- Identified the opportunities and constraints the battlefield environment offers to threat and friendly forces (step 2).

- Thoroughly considered what the threat is capable of what he prefers to do in like situations if unconstrained by the battlefield environment step (step 3).

A close look at each of the four steps reveals that there are assumptions inherent in the traditional process for intelligence preparation of the battlefield. Grouping the assumptions permits their statement in the following summary form:

1. The most critical elements of the environment are weather, terrain, and the enemy in a discrete geographic area.

2. There is an identifiable enemy or threat that will conduct something that resembles combat operations.

3. There is a substantial data base of information that can reveal how the threat organizes and conducts combat. If such a data base does not exist, there will be enough time and information to develop one.

4. That the enemy's actions and the effects of the environment on the enemy are predictable.

Evidence of the first assumption appears in how the IPB process developed and in its current application. The "Wet Trilogy" (representing weather, enemy, and terrain) in early versions of the IPB manual points to the three critical elements exclusively. Current applications of IPB, such as mission analysis briefing formats for example, also focus on these three aspects of the environment. The acronym METT-T, which stands for mission, enemy, troops, terrain and weather, and time available, is the current expanded version of WET that incorporates those three elements.

Chapter six of FM 34-130 is "Intelligence Prepara-
tion of the Battlefield for Operations Other Than
War." The first section of the chapter addresses
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief opera-
tions specifically. It adds guidelines to each of the
IPB steps in an attempt to adapt the process to
the different operational context. The guidelines
consist of a series of special or additional consid-
erations for each step of the IPB process.

For example, to evaluate the threat, one guide-
line is to Identify and evaluate the threat posed
by any groups that may oppose friendly force op-
erations. Consider groups that may clandestinely
oppose the operation even though they publicly
pledge support. Fundamental differences as the
nature of the threat, however, are not supposed to
change the IPB process. The four steps of the IPB
process remain constant regardless of the mission,
unit, staff section, or echelon. The art of applying
IPB to operations other than war is in the proper
application of the steps to specific situations. The
primary difference between IPB for conventional
war and operations other than war is focus --the
degree of detail required --and the demand for
demographic analysis required to support the de-
cision making process.

The doctrine contends that the differences be-
tween humanitarian assistance operations and
war are more quantitative than qualitative. It says
that the challenge is one of acquiring more infor-
mation. Following the same IPB process, the doc-
trine state, intelligence officers will be able to do
for humanitarian assistance operations what they
do for conventional combat situations. Accord-
ing to the doctrine, more detailed information,
including demographics, will permit a prediction
of the enemy courses of action in a humanitarian
assistance operation.

EXERCISE BALKAN BRIDGES 19

LTC **Emrah İBİŞ**, (Na-7)
CG3

1. INTRODUCTION

Exercises as a part of the SEEBRIG's Training aspects prepare the SEEBRIG Staff and assigned units for all Peace Support Operation (PSO) missions in a multinational environment. The main goal of the exercises is to train SEEBRIG staff and units in peacetime in order to help them to achieve the appropriate standard of proficiency as well as to be ready to execute all military tasks in peace support operations. Hence, exercises are one of SEEBRIG's top priorities because they are fundamental to combat PSO readiness.

Within this context, Exercise Balkan Bridges (BB 19) represented milestone training event for SEEBRIG in order to provide a training platform and environment, which contribute to the improvement of war fighting capabilities, as well as to strengthen the linkage between the participating regional partners.

2. BALKAN BRIDGES 2019

a. General:
Balkan Bridges 19 was designed as a Multinational Distributed Computer Assisted Exercise (CAX) / Command Post Exercise (CPX) providing appropriate conditions and environment for testing the integration of national and NATO M&S systems and/or simulators into a regional Information Communication Technology Infrastructure (ICT).

Namely, the South Eastern Europe Exercise and Training Network (SEEETN) was the system utilized for this exercise; furthermore the progress in the SEEETN project development was assessed.

b. Exercise Specifications:
    (1)   Nickname: "BALKAN BRIDGES 19".
    (2)   Form/Type: CAX/CPX under BALKAN CHOD INITIATIVE.
    (3)   Dates: 29 Sep-04 Oct 2019.
    (4)   Area: CHARALITSA (Na-2).
    (5)   OSE: Chief of Defence (BDG).
    (6)   OCE: Commander of Joint Force Command (BDG).
    (7)   ODE: EXDIR (BGR JFC DCOS), Co-EXDIR (Ankara), Co-EXDIR (Belgrade).

c. Exercise Aim:
BB19 aimed to train and exercise the participating HQs and units in conducting PSO as part of a larger NATO Operation in a complex joint and civil-military environment with combat related incidents. BB19 utilized SEEETN as media for communication, data exchange, and simulated operational conduct.

d. Exercise Objectives:
    (1)   Train and exercise the participants to meet the challenges of current and future multidimensional crisis response and peace support operations IAW NATO standards;
    (2)   Enhance the MNBDE HQs ability to exercise Command and Control (C2) over a combined force in a larger NATO Operation in a joint multinational environment.
    (3)   Exercise NATO procedures in planning, operations and reporting between the participating nations and the MNBDE HQs;
    (4)   Test and develop SEEETN.
    (5)   Harmonize the procedures among participating nations in the field of PSO.
    (6)   Promote regional cooperation and the visibility of Balkan CHODS (B9) Initiative;

(7) Promote mutual understanding, cooperation and interoperability among all participating nations, forces, organizations, agencies and personnel;

(8) Practice and improve communications and information exchange/information management between participants;

(9) Provide persistent collaborative environment for sharing information by utilizing SEEETN;

(10) Explore the applicability to B9 of the NATO multinational shared training initiative;

(11) Increase efficiency of the EXCON organization by exploring NATO EXCON support tools;

(12) Proof of concept for integrated tests/experiments into a multinational exercise according to NATO principles.

3. PARTICIPATION OF SEEBRIG TO BALKAN BRIDGES

a.Exercise Planning Process

During the exercise planning process, SEEBRIG HQ represenatives participated in Exercise Specification Conference on 16-17 January 2019, Initial Planning Conference on 13-14 February 2019, Main Planning Conference on 08-09 May 2019 and Final Coordination Conference on 04-05 September 2019.

b.Operational Conduct

On the road towards BB 19 execution, SEEBRIG completed the necessary trainings.

Key Leader Training (KLT) was executed on 15-16 May 2019 at SEEBRIG HQ. The participants were Battalion and Company Commanders of affiliated units. The purpose of this training was to provide detailed information on areas pertinent to SEEBRIG C2 and SOPs. During KLT, the different operational documents before the Execution Phase were presented as well. It provided a great opportunity to discuss different aspects of PSOs.


Battle Staff Training (BST) was utilized in order to train the SEEBRIG Nucleus Staff before the upcoming exercise and coordinate the preparation of subordinate units. BST was a collective training opportunity to fulfill Commander of MNBDE A requirements for decision making process within the HQ. Furthermore, this training accelarated the integration of augmentees to the nucleus staff and provided opportunity to rehearse and test SEEBRIG HQ procedures, Battle Rhythm and standing operation procedures (SOPs). It was the venue for the newcomers to get integrated in the cross-functional activities of the HQ. Furthermore, MINIEX was executed in order to test mainly CIS infrastructure and EXCON functions.

SEEBRIG conducted the exercise BB 19 as Primary Training Audience (PTA) in the role of MNBDE A with an organization consisting of Nucleus Staff (NS-37 Offs/NCOs) and augmentees (AUG-14 Offs/NCOs) from all 9 countries. MNBDE A Commander had operational control of totally 14 Units (5 Battalions, 8 Companies and 1 CIMIC Platoon). SEEBRIG affiliated units took place in the exercise either as Secondary Training Audience (STA) or as Response Cell (RC) located at the simulation centers of their nations.

Augmentees from the contributing Nations in B9 Initiative, augmented MNBDE A for establishing Contingency manning. Total number of the participants in this exercise from the member nation countries and others in MNBDE A was 51.

NATION/ORGANISATION	OFFs	NCOs	TOTAL
SEEBRIG HQ NUCLEUS STAFF			
SEEBRIG HQ	26	9	35
SIG COY	2	1	2
TOTAL	**27**	**10**	**37**
AUGMENTEES FROM B9 NATIONS			
TIRANA	1	-	1
SOFIA	1	-	1
ATHENS	4	-	4
SKOPJE	1	-	1
BUCHAREST	3	-	3
ANKARA	2	-	2
BELGRAD	1	-	1
PODGORICA	-	-	-
SARAJEVO	1	-	1
MNBDE A TOTAL	**41**	**10**	**51**

The main event of the exercise scheduled to be the "Phase III – Execution". All units were artificially set at their AORs/positions at STARTEX. During the Execution phase BB 19 MNBDE A operated in a complex and demanding environment and in this phase, events focused mainly on Peace Support Operations PSO and circumstantially DROs.

On 03 Oct 19, DV Day took place, mainly at Exercise area (Charalitsa) where visitors and observers (DCHODs, Military Attaches and others) from all the participating nations visited exercise facilities and were briefed regarding concept and execution of the exercise.

4. CONCLUSION

Consequently, Balkan Bridge 19 was the main activity for HQ SEEBRIG in 2019. SEEBRIG participated in Balkan Bridge Exercise 2019 (BB 19) for the first time in its history. SEEBRIG personnel together with augmentees found a great opportunity to test its SOPs, in order to achieve training objectives by conducting military decision making process. As a result HQ proved high level of professionalism of its nucleus staff and also the ability to rapidly integrate augmentees in order to conduct its assigned mission. SEEBRIG proved its capabilities as a MNBDE A conducting PSO&DRO in an excellent manner.

The objectives of the exercise BB 19 have been achieved and SEEBRIG is ready for the future exercises and missions.

One Team, One Mission

SEEBRIG's Reception Staging and Onward Movement Process During Operations

LTC **Athanasios DEDIKOUSIS**, (Na-3)
CG4

One of the most important and critical logistics task during an operation is the Reception Staging and Onward Movement (RSOM) of the respective Force that will conduct the aforementioned operation. It is the phase of the deployment process that transitions units, personnel, equipment and material from arrival at Ports of Debarkation (PODs) to their final destination and it requires the provision of significant logistics support (NATO, 2012).

RSOM may be conducted in a wide variety of operational environments. Variations will depend upon the respective capability of the Host Nations (HNs) in which RSOM is taking place. It should be also recognized that HNs may be unable or unwilling to provide full support, which may require other solutions to be generated in order to fully effect RSOM. Equally, whilst the Reception phase could be executed in well developed facilities and in a safe and secure environment, the later Onward Movement phase of the same operation could well be conducted along poorly maintained routes or in a hostile threat environment, or vice-versa. There are many factors that can influence the RSOM plan including the availability and existence of HN infrastructure and support, availability of Contractor Support to Operations (CSO), the prevailing threat environment, and the scale and size of the operation. In consequence, each RSOM plan will be different, mission-specific, and a product of the Operational Planning Process (OPP). The RSOM plan could rely almost exclusively upon HN capabilities to complete the task or equally involve considerable numbers of military force enablers in the event that a HN has limited infrastructure and few resources available to assist or a combination of HN, military or CSO arrangements based on length of operation and follow-on force size. Reception

could take place in international air and sea terminals or conversely at a remote airfield or port with no integral infrastructure (NATO, 2008).

As it was mentioned in the previous paragraph, the operational environment within which RSOM must be conducted can vary widely depending on a multitude of factors. As a result, RSOM capabilities and planning must be adaptable and responsive to dynamic change. For that reason automated planning, tracking and execution tools such as those in Logistic Functional Area Services (LOGFAS) are to be used as fully as possible during all phases. Some of the potential influencing factors include:

- The threat environment.
- Degree of available HNS.
- Condition of Lines of Communication (LOC).
- Available Infrastructure.
- Terrain.
- Weather.

In accordance with NATO (NATO, 2008) and EUMC (European Union Military Committee, 2012), the definitions of RSOM elements are as follows:

• **Reception** is the process of receiving, offloading, marshalling and transporting personnel, equipment and materiel from strategic or operational lift through a sea, air, or land transportation Point of Debarkation (POD), as shown in Figure 1.

• **Staging** is the process of assembling, temporary holding, and organizing of arriving personnel, equipment and materiel into formed units, as they prepare for Onward Movement and further activities. A sample of a Staging area is shown in Figure 2.

• **Onward Movement** is the process of moving units, personnel and accompanying materiel from Staging Areas (SAs) to their Final Destination (FD).

Figure 1: Reception Operations

Figure 2: Staging Area

Reception Process: Reception is the most critical stage of the RSOM operation. The conduct of Reception operations begins with the arrival of deploying forces, equipment and sustainment into a POD and concludes with the Onward Movement of forces into SAs or to their FD under the control of the designated Operation Commander. The Reception process involves two activities; preparation for Reception operations and the conduct of Reception operations.

• **Preparation for Reception Operations:** Reception operations should be planned to ensure the most effective use of POD capacities, taking into account that the same facility may also serve for sustaining the force, for the Reception of follow-on forces, for redeployment operations and for commercial activity. Special attention should be given to POD enablers. Detailed planning, force tracking and movement control are essential to the overall success of Reception.

• **Conduct of Reception Operations:** Reception operations at the PODs include those functions necessary to receive and process unit personnel, equipment, and materiel through the POD. These functions include:

o Receive and process personnel through the Theatre Reception Centre (TRC)[1] system and provide temporary life support as required as defined in the OPLAN.

o Receive equipment and materiel and make preparations for Onward Movement to FDs, MAs, SAs or storage as required.

o The timely movement of personnel, equipment and materiel to a marshalling area gives the Force an opportunity to reassemble limited unit capability.

o Conduct movement control operations.

Staging Process: Staging Areas (SAs) provide the necessary facilities, sustainment and other support in order to enable deploying forces, which have limited mission capability and may not be self-sustainable during this phase, to become mission capable. Forces may require different levels of life support depending on the duration of the Staging process. The identification of support requirements is therefore a vital element in the planning process. Multinational support should be pre-planned, and coordinated with NSEs, to optimise the logistic footprint and associated security requirements.

Onward Movement Process: Efficient Onward Movement requires a balanced, integrated system of terminal transfer operations, movement control, and cargo transfer operations. The Onward Movement process encompasses logistic support and often includes HNS. The Force Commander prioritises the Onward Movement. The seamless flow of forces and real-time in-transit visibility information are key elements of the Onward Movement process. The following capabilities are also necessary to ensure successful Onward Movement:

• Movement Control.
• Use of the transportation network.
• Communications.
• Logistic Support.
• Medical Support.
• Force Protection.

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1) A TRC is defined as "a location established to receive forces into an operational theatre, conduct essential personnel administration tasks and establish the personnel tracking process".

SEEBRIG's Generic Contingency Operation Plan (SEEBRIG, 2018) states that any possible operation will be conducted in three phases: Deployment, Implementation and Redeployment. Furthermore, the Deployment phase is divided in 4 sub-phases, while RSOM is conducted in sub-phases 3 and 4.

Depending on the type of operation and the situation, HNs will assume the responsibility to operate PODs in the area of operation. HNs in PODs will be under the coordinating authority of Joint Rear Area Control Center (JRACC). HNs will also open and operate Marshalling Areas (MAs) in the vicinity of PODs for carrying of troops and equipment during reception in coordination with NSEs Rear Command Post (RCP).

Regarding Reception phase, it will be coordinated at APODs/SPODs by HNs, SEEBRIG Rear Command Post (RCP) and Theatre Movement Control Centre (TMCC) according to operational priorities and status of reception facilities. Once access to a point of debarkation is given, HNs will coordinate APODs/SPODs operations and unit's follow on movement to MAs and to SAs through reception elements. During the Staging phase, HNs will provide logistics support to SEEBRIG regarding personnel services (i.e. potable water distribution, dining facility operations, showers, latrines and thrash-sewage removal). Finally, regarding the Onward Movement phase, Nations will execute the movement and transportation of their units to the FD. The movement will be coordinated by SEEBRIG RCP and TMCC.

SEEBRIG's Generic Deployment Plan (SEEBRIG, 2003) states that the Force will be divided in 4 Echelons:
•	1st Echelon: Forward Party Liaison Team (FPLT), Forward HQ of Combat Service Support (CSS) Bn. and National Liaison Teams (NLTs) or Advance Parties of the Units.
•	2nd Echelon: SEEBRIG Forward HQ, Rear Command Post (RCP), CSS Bn Command Post, Key Elements.
•	3rd Echelon: SEEBRIG Main Command Post (MCP) and Engineer Task Force (ETF) Command Post.
•	4th Echelon: Sub-units.

The 1st Echelon will establish liaison with the unit that will replace, the Higher Command (HICOM), the National Liaison Teams (NLTs) of SEEBRIG Units and the local authorities and will provide with an updated situation of the Area of Operations (AOR) to Parent HQ. Its main issue is to facilitate suitable conditions in the AOR for the FWD HQ, RCP and SEEBRIG key elements. After having coordinated the deployment of FWD HQ, RCP and SEEBRIG's key elements with the units operating already in the mission area, the 1st Echelon will lead FWD HQ and coordinate RSOM of key elements to its permanent / temporary working place, to their staging areas.

THE 2nd Echelon will coordinate all necessary communications links and arrange logistic requirements before MCP deployment, coordinate deployment and operations of SEEBRIG key elements, reception and HNS for MCP. SEEBRIG RCP will coordinate the RSOM of MCP /ETF CP and all assigned SEEBRIG Units (3rd and 4th Echelons), will coordinate and provide admin and logistic support, will coordinate NSE operations, and will take over the tactical control of CSS Bn elements which will prepare and manage, along with local authorities, the reception and staging of the SEEBRIG's units. After completion of the staging phase, SEEBRIG RCP will monitor and coordinate, with TMCC and NSEs, all the movements from their current locations to their FD.

SEEBRIG's RSOM process is planned to be conducted step by step, with the 1st Echelon establishing liaison with the HNs and coordinating the RSOM for the 2nd Echelon, which will conduct the RSOM operation for the rest of the force and in close coordination with local authorities in order to achieve the maximum logistics support from HN. The generic deployment of SEEBRIG will be as shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3: Generic Deployment Overlay of SEEBRIG

As a conclusion we should highlight once more that RSOM process is very important and critical regarding the success of the operation. It has to be planned in details and because it requires a significant logistics support, multinational logistics solutions in addition to host nation support should be used in order to minimize the overall logistics footprint.

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SEEBRIG's STEPS - from Mission Taken to Mission Starts

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SEEBRIG is a family, family of nations, family of armies. This army's family involving six South-Eastern European countries has his own spirit and of course his own specific rules. All decisions within this family have been taken by consensus among the countries.

SEEBRIG was created for possible deployment in UN or OSCE-mandated NATO-led or EU-led conflict prevention and other peace support operations (including peace-keeping, peace-making, peace-building and humanitarian operations.). It could also participate in "coalition of the willing" type international initiatives.

With the capabilities it have and with the SEEDRO (South Eastern Europe Disaster Relief Operations) concept the door for participation in disaster relief operations (DRO) was oppened. In NATO-led or EU-led peace support operations, SEEBRIG will be subordinate to the bodies delineated in the mandate of the relevant international organization after the Contributing nations (SEEBRIG's nations) have agreed to undertake such operation. The military body under which SEEBRIG will function will be jointly decided by the nations. Tasks to be undertaken by SEEBRIG and Operation's Rules of Engagement (ROE) shall be derived from the resolutions of the international organization which has undertaken a given operation and shall be subject to approval of the Contributing nations, based on the proposals by the Politico-Military Steering Comitee (PMSC).

SEEBRIG has already been deployed within International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, for six months (from February to August 2006 - Pictures 1&2). During this mission SEEBRIG HQ staff was the core of Kabul Multinational Brigade IX HQ, which showed up its reliability and in the best way justified the confidence which had been given by NATO.

The way SEEBRIG have to pass from Mission Taken to Mission Starts (Diagram 1) has been split into 10 steps by SEEBRIG's HQ in order to be flexible and to accomplish the necessery requirements prior to have it conducting its mission on a terrain. Normally this process took about 120 days and its steps are going to be explained bellow:

Diagram 1: SEEBRIG's STEPS FROM MISSION TAKEN TO MISSION STARTS

Step 1: MISSION TAKEN - Receiving the MISSION by PMSC.

The decision for participation in operations and deployments, which is initially to be proposed by the PMSC, will be subject to political and military consultations carried out through meetings of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Ministers of Defence, Chiefs of Defence/General Staffs and the Politico-Military Steering Committee and will be approved by the Contributing nations through their respective national legal procedures.

After receiving the mission(D-60), SEEBRIG's operational planing group (OPG) is going to be activated. OPG is going to initiate operational planning process (OPP) which include 5 (five) Stages - INITIATION, ORIENTATION, CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT, PLAN DEVELOPMENT and PLAN REVIEW. During Stage 1 – INITIATION, planing oficers will start gathering necessary information about upcoming mission. Initiating Directive needs to be analyzed so SEEBRIG's operational planning group will perform Mission Analysis (first step of ORIENTATION - Stage 2 of SEEBRIG's OPP) (Picture 3).

Afterwards, a recce party is going to be sent to the mission area in order to conduct fact-finding in the mission area and to collect latest information. At the end of this step Mission Analysis Briefing to the Commander of SEEBRIG will take a place.

Step 2: COMSEEBRIG's PLANNING GUIDANCE.

In accordance with the information provided by Recce Party after visiting mission area and after Mission Analysis Briefing, COM SEEBRIG will issue planning guidances to HQ (Stage 2 – ORIENTATION of OPP will be done), and Activation Warning Messages are going to be submitted to the nations in order to inform them about upcoming operation, so affiliated units to start mission preparation including mission oriented training.

After having COMSEEBRIG's planning guidances (Picture 4) Operational Planing Group is going to start with Stage 3 of OPP – CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT. Staff will perform additional analysis, comprehensive range of courses of action (COAs – Picture 5) which achieve the mission given and meet the Commander's Planning Guidances are going to be developed and Decision Brief will be introduced to the COM SEEBRIG. Afterwards the prefered or modified by the Commander COA is going to be transformed into Concept of operations (CONOPS) (Picture 6).

Step 3: SEEBRIG's SOR.

With all affiliated units SEEBRIG stands as very powerfull structure which is capable to cover and fulfil wide range of tasks. Most likely there will be no case which requre all the units to take part in planned mission/operation.

SEEBRIG statement of requirements (SOR), which details the size, type and composition of the force will be prepared and sent to the Nations during this step in the period from D-38 to D-36 (Stage 3 of OPP – CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT is done).

OPG is going to start development of OPLAN (Stage-4 PLAN DEVELOPMENT). Activation Request (ACTREQ) messages are going to be submitted to the Nations by SEEBRIG. Nations will submit their written formal responses, namely force preparation messages (FORCEPREPS) to the SEEBRIG HQ and inform the HQ about their force contribution and national limitations. In this step, if required (SORs are not covered/met by Nation's answers), HQ SEEBRIG may host a force generation conference to discuss with the Contributing Nations the SEEBRIG's SOR and provided national contributions in order to have a consensus. At that moment the structure of SEEBRIG for the upcoming mission is going to be shaped. A second force generation conference may follow the first one in case of any shortage in force contribution. At the Force Generation Conference in accordanse with the mandate and mission given SEEBRIG's ORBAT list is going to be created (D-20/D-18). Case by case there will be Order for Battle (ORBAT) list prepared for each Mission/Operation..

Step 4: FINALIZING OF OPLAN.

Second Recce will be conducted in the mission area (Picture 7) in order to estabnish comunication lines with local authorities and to check availability and conditions of port of debarcation (POD) by sea and by air, Reception and Staging areas and Supply Routes in mission area. Contributing Nation's recce teams (including units' commanders) will be invited to participate in this recce.

Logistics conference (Picture 8) will be held in the mission area and HQ SEEBRIG will act as a main coordinator. The participants to this conference should be the representatives from Contrybuting nations, Mission's Land Component Command representative and Host nation (optional). At this conference nations should present their Deployment plans and logistics requirements, which they couldn't meet by their own national assets. A draft Combined Deployment Plan is going to be prepared by SEEBRIG HQ in close coordination with Contrybuting Nations and Mission's Land Component Command.

SEEBRIG OPLAN and SEEBRIG Deployment Plan should be completed at the period from D-10 to D-8. Endorsement of those plans by PMSC will take a place not later than D-6.

Meanwhile, the contingency establishment (CE) personnel (augmentation of personnel for the SEEBRIG'sHQ under operational conditions) of HQ SEEBRIG arrive at the HQ. A mission oriented training period starts at HQ SEEBRIG for CE.

Step 5: ENDORCEMENT OF OPLAN.
PMSC members discusse the OPLAN and when they reach an agreement on that, they endorse it. (not later than D-6).

Step 6: APPROVAL OF THE OPLAN by the Ministers of Contributing nations.

After the approval of OPLAN at the begining of this step, SEEBRIG HQ releases the activation order (ACTORD) message to the Contributing Nations and start to prepare for deployment. Stage 4 of OPP – PLAN DEVELOPMENT is finalized during this step and Stage 5 – PLAN REVIEW (results in issuing updates and amendments to OPLAN) could be initiated if situation require.

Step 7: SEEBRIG's DEPLOYMENT STARTS.
On D-day the first element of SEEBRIG- Forward Planning and Liaison Team will deploy to the mission area. This team deploys to work along with the Local authorities, Local Sequrity forces, Government and Non Goverment organizations and other Key Players in the mission area in order to prepare the terain for upcoming SEEBRIG's forces. SEEBRIG's Forward HQ team is going to be the second wave of the deployment. Forward HQ initially sets all necessary communications and logistic requirements before deployment of the main body.

Step 8: SEEBRIG DEPLOYMENT COMPLETES.
SEEBRIG main command post (MCP) completes its deployment in the mission area at the begining of this period. Simultaneously units start to deploy in the mission area as they have thirty days to acomplish this task. Deployment of the units is national responsibility, but SEEBRIG HQ will keep the track on the movement of the units.

Step 9:TRANSFER OF AUTHORİTY (TOA).

The deployment will be completed till day D+45, when the OPCON of the allocated units is going to be granted to COMSEEBRIG by TOA messages sent by the Nations to SEEBRIG Main Comand Post. The force integration and training period in the mission area will start. All assigned units are supposed to complete its orientation, hand-over, take-over procedures with their counter parts not later than D+60. Units are going to report to SEEBRIG HQ that respective areas of operation were taken over and units are ready to start their mission. At the end of this step ful operational capability (FOC) of SEEBRIG is going to be acomplished and reported through the chain of command.

Step 10: MISSION STARTS.

After having completed TOA and hand over - take over procedure, HQ SEEBRIG informs MISSION'S Commander of Land Component Command, Contributing Nations and PMSC via submitting the SITREP that the deployment was completed FOC was reached and OPORD is going to be executed.

SEEBRIG is a family, and we committed ourself to serve to this family. We train, exercise and prepare ourself for any possible future task which can appear hereafter. This family already had its mission in the year of 2006 and amongst hostile environment of Afghanistan It proved its effectiveness and combat capabilities. The year of 2006 was far ago so may be it is a time for next SEEBRIG's mission.

Frequency Management in Peace Support Operations – The Invisible Battlefield

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G6 FMO

Military operations rely heavily on equipment using the limited resources of the electromagnetic spectrum. The effectiveness of ships at sea, soldiers in the field, and planes in the sky depend on the capabilities of radars, sensors, satellites and radios. In turn, the capabilities of these systems are dependent on the unseen resource of spectrum. In the past, the availability of this unseen resource was a minor issue for the Military Commanders. However, today, new technologies, the needs of other users (government and commercial) have made maintaining spectrum allocations difficult. Frequency management is the planning, coordinating, and managing the use of the electromagnetic spectrum through different procedures. The goal of frequency management is to enable electronic systems to perform their functions without causing or experiencing unacceptable interference.

Peacetime frequency management is a function of sovereign nations. All military forces deploying to a foreign country and requiring access to the spectrum must coordinate with their civil administrations through the common spectrum management procedures. Frequency management during military operations differs with the type of operation.

TYPE OF OPERATION WITH DIFFERENT SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT REQUIREMENTS

Disaster Relief Operation (DRO). Military forces may be deployed to provide aid to the civil administration in a mix of civil and military disaster relief agencies. The governmental administration of host nation will provide a spectrum management framework for deployed military force.

Peace Support Operation (PSO). The civil or military government administration will provide spectrum management framework for the deployed military force. When military forces are performing peacekeeping or peace enforcement functions in areas of the world where government administration and the rule of law have failed, then this responsibility will be delegated to a lead military force. The restoration of the government administration including a civil frequency management capability will be an aim of the operation in this case.

Defense of National Territory. This would most probably be within the context of an alliance, involving the mixed forces of several nations over a wide area. The military spectrum management would be conducted in conjunction with the host nations' civil and military administrations.
On another hand, from frequency management point of view the military operations can be divided in two categories.

Operations with Host Nation Support The force frequency manager will establish contact with the military or civil administration, as appropriate, and seek the necessary frequency support to meet the force's requirements. The mandate, for a force to deploy into the sovereign territory of another nation, should specify access to sufficient spectrum.

Operations without Host Nation Support Coordination will not be extended to enemy nations or their military. However, consideration must be given to friendly or neutral neighboring countries. In any scenario, the Combined Task Force Commander must consider the effects on civilian safety services of all nations in the region and consider issuing Notices to Aviators and Mariners (NOTAMs) warning of the dangers to them in the area of conflict.

Regardless of the type of operation, the Commander, as part of his direction, should receive details of the mandate under which his force is to operate. The mandate should specify or imply the extent to which the Commander may assume the temporary authority to make frequency assignments within the area of operation.

ROLES, FUNCTIONS, AND TASKS OF THE FREQUENCY MANAGER DURING PSO

Within the limits imposed by higher authority, the commander has authority to assign frequencies for his forces use within his area of operations. Normally the Commander will establish a Frequency Management Cell (FMC) within the G6 to implement the policies of the radio frequency spectrum. It is the FMC responsibility to coordinate with all spectrum users in the Area of Responsibility (AOR) during PSO. The goal is to control the electromagnetic spectrum so that it serves the needs of own forces while denying use to the enemy. In order to do those frequency managers have to execute the following:

Determining Frequency Requirements The unit table of organization and equipment will identify most of the emitters. The spectrum manager should also take into account civilian equipment that use frequency to operate. The spectrum manager should also periodically maintain awareness of subordinate unit's emitters. This can be done through a call out message to all subordinate units.

Processing Requirements Processing frequency requests consists of requesting, obtaining, and distributing the frequency resources to the proper user and equipment. The request process flows from lower to higher while the resources flow from higher to lower. In some instances the spectrum manager may have to directly coordinate with host nation spectrum representatives for support.

Frequency Deconfliction It is used to coordinate the use of the electromagnetic spectrum for operations, communications, and intelligence functions. This is due to the highly dynamic nature of tactical operations and the inability of the tools to do real-time updates automatically. In fast paced operations the spectrum manager will mainly be concerned with interference resolution or deconfliction by exception.

Frequency Interference Resolution Interference is the radiation, emission, or indication of electromagnetic energy; unintentionally causing degradation, disruption, or complete obstruction of the designated function of the electronic equipment affected. Interference resolution is performed by the spectrum manager at the echelon receiving the interference. The frequency manager is the final authority of interference. Interference may come from signal devices (such as unintentional friendly and unfriendly radios and radars) and from non-signal devices (such as welders or vehicle engines).The skill level of systems operators and maintenance personnel can mean the difference between a minor inconvenience and complete system disablement. When experiencing harmful interference, the operator should be able to discern whether the interference is coming from natural phenomena or man-made sources. If natural phenomena are the cause, the operator should try to work through the interference. An alternate frequency may be assigned if the interference persists. If the operator suspects man-made interference, the case will be referred to the spectrum manager at the next higher echelon. The spectrum manager will conduct an analysis of the database, a site survey (if possible), and coordinate with other units in the vicinity to identify the cause of the interference. If the spectrum manager is unable to isolate the cause of the in-

terference they will submit a report to the next spectrum management level for resolution.

The FMC, will publish, distribute and maintain a Joint Restricted Frequency List (JRFL) based on inputs from the G-2, G-3, and G-6. The JRFL defines three types of frequencies that are protected from specific uses as defined below.

Taboo Frequencies: These are any friendly frequencies of such importance that they must never be deliberately jammed or interfered with by friendly forces. These frequencies include international distress, safety, and controller frequencies. They are generally long-standing.

Protected Frequencies: These are frequencies used for a particular operation. They are identified and protected to prevent them from being inadvertently jammed by friendly forces, while active electronic warfare operations are directed against hostile forces. These frequencies are of such critical importance that jamming should be restricted.

An example of a protected frequency would be the command net of a maneuver force engaged in the fight.

Guarded Frequencies: Enemy frequencies, which are currently being exploited for combat information and intelligence. These frequencies may be jammed after the commander has weighed the potential operational gain against the loss of technical information. An example of a guarded frequency is an enemy intelligence frequency that is being monitored.

In conclusion, frequency managers are the staff engaged in planning, coordinating, and managing access to the Electromagnetic Spectrum both in peace time and during operations. Part of their mission is to educate others on the value of frequency management as the main tool to achieve information superiority. Commanders must realize that spectrum is a resource just like fuel or ammunition but cannot be touched or seen.

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Financing Terrorism

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There is no universal agreement on the definition of terrorism. Various legal systems and government agencies use different definitions. Moreover, governments can't seem to agree inestablishinga legally binding definition. Difficulties arise from the fact that the term has become nationally, politically and emotionally charged. One government's considered terrorist group is another government's liberating army/group etc.

NATO defines terrorism as *"The unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence, instilling fear and terror, against individuals or property in an attempt to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, or to gain control over a population, to achieve political, religious or ideological objectives."*

In 2004, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1566, condemned terrorist acts as *"criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, which constitute offences within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature".*

Since 9/11, international cooperation against international terrorism has improved. However, as mentioned before, the global community is still far from recognizing one country's terrorist group as all countries' enemy. Nowadays, there are recorded more than 120 extremist/terrorist groups acting globally or regionally. Each country or international organization, such as the EU and the UN, has its' own "blacklist" of terrorist organization, that "surprisingly" does not match comparatively and reflect security concerns of the respective country/organization.

In 2018, the well-known economic magazine Forbes, published a list of the top-10 wealthiest terrorist organizationsin **terms of total annual income, based on the US State Department list of foreign terrorist organizations:**

#1 Hezbollah - $1.1 billion: funding from countries, charities, real estate, money laundering, drugs, weapons trade, forgery.

#2 The Taliban - $800 million: drugs, pirate mining, ransom, donations.

#3 Hamas - $700 million: funding from countries, taxes on money changing companies, security, real estate, hotelsand tourism.

#4 Al-Qaeda& branches - $300 million: trade of drugs, weapons, automobiles, people, illegal trade in cigarettes and tobacco, ransom, pirate mining and illegal coal trade.

#5 ISIS - $200 million: possession of oil and gas fields, mineral deposits, agricultural lands, factories, weapons, taxes and 'protection' fees, ransom, donations, external aid.

#6 PKK - $180 million: drug trade, human trafficking – smuggling people/substances, pirating of tobacco and cigarettes, supporters/donations.

#7 – Kata'ibHezbollah - $150 million: external aid, ransom.

#8 – Palestinian Islamic Jihad - $100 million: external aid.

#9 – Lashkar-e-Taiba - $75 million: supporters/donations, charities, external aid.

#10 – The Real IRA - $50 million: smuggling/selling cigarettes & tobacco, pirate network of falsified alcohol and fuel products, protection fees, supporters/donations. A close look at the way these organizations are able to sustain themselves and operate, can reveal to us the way and set some ground rules on how they are generally funded.

SOURCES OF TERRORISM FINANCING

• **Charities**. Donations were once the largest source of terrorist funding, coming mostly from charities and wealthy individuals. Moreover, terrorists often use people who have no criminal backgrounds to complete financial transactions as they would not to be tracked as easily. These transactions are often disguised as donations to charities and gifts from family and though these are legal transactions, their intended purpose is illegal, because it benefits the terrorist organizations. The internet is a growing modern form of terrorist finance as it is able to protect the anonymity that it can provide to the donor and recipient. Terrorist organizations use propaganda in order to rally up financial support from those who follow them. A number of international non-profit organizations, other foundations, networks and private donors, which have or claim to have social or cultural goals, laid the foundation for the financial capacities of ISIS/Daesh, Al-Qaeda and other jihadist organizations and act as a cover for abusive practices. Al-Qaeda's global fundraising network is built on donations to charities and NGOs, which communicate with donors through social media and online forums.

• **Illegal Activities.** The largest source of terrorists' income is the illicit drug trade. Afghanistan's flourishing poppy crops, which the United Nations say are responsible for as much as 90% of the world opium supply, are widely believed to be a major source of terrorist funding. Al-Qaeda reportedly profited from the Afghan poppy trade before fleeing the country when the Taliban-led government was ousted in 2001. In total, more than 400 tons of heroinis produced in Afghanistan each year and the net value of opium exports alone constitutes around 12% of the country's GDP. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) has long used the cocaine trade to finance its operations.

Many terrorist groups have supported themselves through other types of illegal commerce as well. For instance, according to sources the terrorists behind the 1993 World Trade Center bombing raised money by selling counterfeit t-shirts on New York City's Broadway. Also, the perpetrators of the 2004 Madrid train bombings sold counterfeited CDs and trafficked drugs to support their activities.

The scope of illegal tobacco trade in North Africa currently stands at more than $1 billion annually and according to the UN comes out to about 60 billion black market cigarettes annually, of which a significant portion flows directly to the criminal and terrorist organizations controlling the region. According to the newspaper "Sun", in 2016 senior UK government officials declared that IRA members are responsible for about 40% of the illegal tobacco market in Britainand with the profits generated by this industry annually tens of millions of dollars in royalties go directly to the IRA.

• **Ransom.** An additional source of income comes from abductions and ransom payments, which bring huge sums into the terror organizations' accounts. Tahrir al-Sham, an Al-Qaeda's proxy in Syria, released a Qatari royalty after receiving a ransom payment of $130 million according to the Financial Times. Kata'ibHezbollah was the organization that headed the plan and execution of the abductions of 26 members of the Qatari royal family while they were on a falcon hunting expedition in December 2015. The royal family paid, according to the Financial Times, about $700 million dollars in exchange for the hostages' release.

A TYPICAL MONEY LAUNDERING SCHEME

• **Front Companies/Money laundering.** Many terrorist organizations attempt to operate legitimate businesses, which generate their own profits and can also be used as a front for money laundering. Ties to terrorism have been found amid the trade of livestock, fish, and leather. Businesses involved in agriculture and construction have also been found to support terrorism. In 2001, the New York Times reported that Osama bin Laden owned and operated a string of retail honey shops throughout the Middle East and Pakistan. In addition to generating revenue, the honey was used to conceal shipments of money and weapons. **Money laundering** is the process where cash raised from criminal activities is made to look legitimate for re-integration into the financial system. This can be achieved by bulk cash smuggling and placement through cash-intensive businesses or moving money through the online payment systems. They also use trade linked schemes to launder money. Nonetheless, the older systems have not given way. Terrorists also continue to move around money through international ATM transactions. Said and Cherif Kouachi, before the "Charlie Hebdo" shooting in Paris, France in 2015, used transaction laundering to fund their activities

• **External Aid.** There is a number of countries that subsidize terrorist/extremist organizations/groups, in order to promote their economic and political interests, as well as religious beliefs, in a certain neighboring region or even not near their national borders. According to a study conducted by the New York Times, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was considered to be among the heaviest funders of the Taliban. Moreover, Iran is often accused of funding Hezbollah, with more than $800 million annually.

• **Control on natural sources and population.** In the case of ISIS, the vast lands that the organization captured during its rapid conquests throughout 2014 made up the source of its wealth. ISIS controlled oil and gas fields, rich mineral deposits and fertile agricultural lands, producing an annual income of about $3 billion. Also, such organizations raise funds through taxing the inhabitants of the territories under their control. For example, Al-Qaeda of the Arab succeeded in taking over Mukalla, an important central port city in Yemen. Their control of the city, held until April

2016, generated about 2 million dollars a day for the organization from collecting protection fees and taxes, as well as pocketing an additional 20 million dollars from plundering local banks.

In conclusion, it seems that one of the key elements of the fight against terrorism is to cut off its sources of financing. Because terrorist networks transcend national boundaries, improving international cooperation is essential.

There is a number of organizations tasked to promote effective implementation of legal, regulatory and operational measures for combating terrorist financing, intergovernmental, such as the UN's *Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and non-governmental, such as the Association of Certified Anti-Money laundering Specialists (ACAMS).*

Financial data are a significant tool for gathering intelligence in order to analyze terrorist networks and find ways of effective disruption of their operations. There is a need for comprehensive and preventive strategies based on the exchange of basic information and improved global cooperation among financial intelligence units, intelligence agencies and law enforcement agencies involved in combating the financing of terrorism.

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From Information Operations To Influence, Contemporary Developments In Military Operations

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CG9

We are currently in an information age and the various methods of communication are constantly advancing in rapid and often unpredictable ways that require awareness, understanding and flexibility for both civilian and military actors involved in the contemporary armed conflicts.


All past, current and future military operations encompass a critical information component. Information operations or the information warfare are not something new.

NATO doctrine defines Information Operations as a staff function to analyze the Information Environment (IE), plan, synchronize and assess Information Activities (IA) to create desired effects on the will, understanding and capability of adversaries, enemies and North Atlantic Council - approved audiences in support of Alliance mission objectives, where the IE is comprised of the information itself, the individuals, organizations and systems that receive, process and convey the information, and the cognitive, virtual and physical space in which this occurs.

It is recognized that a crucial element of the military operations is the public support, both at home and in the theater of operations. While current NATO doctrine prevents IA targeting of own public, cheap, accessible and interactive technology can be exploited by competent adversaries

to "design" perception to affect a directed reality. We are witnessing a growing role of nonmilitary means of achieving political and strategic goals, and how, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force or weapons in their effectiveness.

Whole populations can be reached through mobile networks, Internet news, social media and influenced in real-time. The growth of cyberspace has expanded in a new dimension of the battlespace. In recent conflicts (Syria, Ukraine), we notice how communication networks and social media are able to convey, confirm, or deny the facts on the ground faster than military or government means. It is possible that using commercially available drones, video cameras, and jammers, to consistently leverage information operations to influence, corrupt, or disrupt the decision making cycles. By the means of widely available and increasingly sophisticated software, it is possible to produce realistic video and audio recordings with fabricated dialogue (so-called deepfakes), that along with fake news have the potential to pose a threat to governance and public confidence, undermining government and military leaders.

In simple terms, we are dealing with an Influence & Counter Influence game which will require reforms of structures, working methods and mindset.

These reforms should start with the mindset - stop seeing information and influence as subsets or sub components of warfare and start thinking that they are warfare (traditionally not thought about in the past). Adequate dissemination of information for both kinetic and non-kinetic activities have been historically problematic for the military forces whether it is about countering enemy use of information, or working to sustain the support of the public through timely and accurate communication. An example of new working method is a proper implementation of Strategic Communication (StratCom), defined in NATO Doctrine as "The coordinated and appropriate use of NATO communications activities and capabilities – Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs (PA), Military Public Affairs, Information Operations (Info Ops) and Psychological Operations (PSYOPS), as appropriate – in support of Alliance policies, operations and activities, and in order to advance NATO's aims.", with appropriate measures for structural integration, manning and training.
(image 1)

For SEEBRIG, the reforms could mean changes in the HQ structure, manning, training, and Standing Operating Procedures. A possible new organizational structure of the HQ is presented below.
(image 2)

The model depicted in the diagram, is derived from the models used currently in NATO at the operational level. DCOS Influence / StratComAD is fully integrated into the Special Advisory Group (SAG) and has direct tasking authority over the various communication functions. As shown in the model Chief PAO's place in the SAG gives direct access to Command Group for Public Affairs matters.

While structure and manning are not so easy to change, as they require changing of the founding MPFSEE Agreement and/or its Additional Protocols (process that may take years), ad-hoc arrangements and processes "in the spirit" of the abovementioned proposal can be implemented for training and exercises.

(image 1)

(image 2)

Tactical, operational, and strategic success will ask for a cultural change to embrace non-lethal warfare. To dominate the non-lethal domain in general and the Influence & Counter-Influence in particular - before, during, and after the future conflicts, significant changes are required in the military approach toward training and education of information as a warfighting function.

Social, Cultural and Recreational Activities within SEEBRIG

MAJ **Kleanthis PARASKEVOPOULOS**, (Na-3)
G9 Plans Officer

During 2019, SEEBRIG nucleus staff and ther family members participated in many significant activities, which included not only, social trips and cultural visits to local touristic objectives but also, recreational events which provided them with the opportunity to familiarize themselves with the host nation's environment and culture, as well as to strengthen the SEEBRIG community relations.

A ski training activity for SEEBRIG HQ personnel at Elatochori ski centre took place on 22nd Jan 2019. The main purposes of this activity were training, physical strengthening, stamina improving as well as team spirit building and mental energy restoring. Moreover, everybody had the opportunity either to improve his skiing skills or even to get acquainted with the beautiful natural environment of the ski centre. This stress draining activity restored vitality of SEEBRIG HQ personnel.

A social trip for SEEBRIG HQ personnel and their family members to Karpenisi took place from 16th to 17th Feb 2019. The main purposes of this activity were team spirit building, mental energy restoring as well as visiting specific objectives in the region. Moreover, everybody had the opportunity either to improve their skiing skills at the local ski centre

or to visit the famous Monastery of Proussou, close to the city of Karpenisi. Additionally, on Sunday 17 Feb 19, all participants had a lunch at the Officers' Club, hosted by the Commander of the Logistics Training Center, which is located in the city of Lamia. This stress draining activity restored vitality of SEEBRIG HQ personnel and their families.

On 22nd of May 2019, SEEBRIG HQ personnel along with their families climbed on mountain Kissavos (altitude 1978m), which is located 45 km northeast of Larissa, Na3. The main purposes of this activity were physical training as well as team building, restoring physical and mental energy and improving stamina. All participants had the oppor-

tunity to enjoy the environment of mountain Kissavos and to get closer in their relationship, while reaching its highest peak. Moreover, this activity offered new perspectives, drained stress and restored vitality of the SEEBRIG HQ personnel and their families.

In accordance with Annual Plan 2019, SEEBRIG HQ conducted a Study Trip to Crete/Na 3, from 7 to 14 of July 2019.

During the Study Trip, SEEBRIG nucleus staff visited two important military facilities of the Host Nation and NATO (NATO Maritime Interdiction Operational Training Centre /NMIOTC and NATO Missile Firing Installation/NAMFI in Chania area), where they had an opportunity to learn about the latest developments in the respective areas of interest and also to enhance awareness about SEEBRIG and its activities.

The SEEBRIG leadership and staff appreciated the quality and the high standard of the military facilities and the hospitality of the Host Nation.

Apart from the main effort of the study trip, SEEBRIG HQ personnel accompanied by their family members had the opportunity to visit the archaeological site of Knossos, the city of Rethymno, the CretAquarium and, on the way back to Larissa, the museum and monument of Thermopiles.

This Study trip achieved its goals, was educational, beneficial and pleasant for all participants.

On 11th September 2019, SEEBRIG HQ organized a guided visit to the city of Larissa for the newly appointed personnel.

Creating the conditions for better understanding the culture of the country where SEEBRIG is deployed and increasing the awareness of the nucleus staff towards the values and traditions of the Host Nations, is part of SEEBRIG's mission.

Participants in this event were SEEBRIG HQ newcomers and their families' members. They had the chance to visit some significant historical landmarks of Larissa, such as the archaeological site of the Ancient Theater of Larisa, ancient Roman ruins and the city centre where they had the chance to learn about different aspects of the town. At the end of the tour everybody felt a little bit more as citizen of Larissa.

A social trip for SEEBRIG HQ personnel and their family members to Chalkidiki took place from 14th to 15th Sep 2019. The main purposes of this activity were team spirit building and mental energy restoring.

Moreover, everybody had the opportunity to improve their swimming skills and to visit the town of Ouranoupolis, as well. Additionally, on Sunday 15 Sep 19, everybody participated in a ship cruise from Ouranoupolis to Athos peninsula and back, where they had the chance to observe some of the famous monasteries that are located there.

This stress draining activity restored vitality of SEEBRIG HQ personnel and their families.

Apart from the military aspects of its activities, SEEBRIG focuses on the improvement of its social profile, by contributing to the local society and promoting altruism, solidarity and care for the people in need.

On Wednesday 18 Dec 19, a delegation of officers and NCOs from SEEBRIG HQ visited the Institution - nursery of "Little Swallows" where they delivered food and toys. Moreover, SEEBRIG offered food to the churches of Saint George and God's Wisdom in order to support the breadlines, which reach hundreds of people daily.

Finally, an official New Year dinner took place for SEEBRIG personnel and their family members at Ktima Elena restaurant on 20 December 2019.

Commander of SEEBRIG Brigadier General Tudorică PETRACHE delivered his New Year speech and wished Happy New Year to all.

Afterwards, gifts were offered to the children of SEEBRIG families. This event was an excellent opportunity to built a strong cohesion among SEEBRIG personnel and their families and to exchange cultural experiences among them.

South-Eastern Europe Brigade "SEEBRIG"

Believing that cooperation and dialog among the countries of South-Eastern Europe must be further developed and considering their commitment to contribute to regional security and stability, and to foster good neighborly relations, among the countries, an Agreement on Multinational Peace Force South-Eastern Europe (MPFSEE) was signed by the Ministers of Defense of the seven participating countries in Skopje on 26 September 1998.

In accordance with MPFSEE Agreement, the South-Eastern Europe Brigade (SEEBRIG) was established and activated by seven participating Nations, on 31st of August 1999 in Plovdiv, Na-2 and was then hosted in Constanta, Na-6, then in Istanbul, Na-7 and is currently located in Tyrnavos (Larissa), Na-3.

The current structure of the MPFSEE is a brigade-sized force of about 5000 troops and is known as South-Eastern Europe Brigade (SEEBRIG).

Units allocated to the SEEBRIG will remain at their permanent home base locations and will be committed under a task force principle for exercises and operations upon the decisions of the participating Nations and appropriate joint direction and coordination of the "Politico-Military Steering Committee (PMSC)".

In accordance of the provisions of the Agreement :

The Brigade will be declared to UN and OSCE. It will be available, commensurate with its capabilities, for employment in conflict prevention and in other peace support operations, including peace-keeping, peace-making, peace-building and humanitarian operations.

The force will be available for possible employment in UN or OSCE-mandated NATO-led or EU-led conflict prevention and other peace support operations. It could also participate in "coalition of the willing" type international initiatives. The Force will also function "within the sprit" of PfP.

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SEEBRIG HQ

POWER THROUGH UNITY

MPFSEE

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"ONE TEAM, ONE MISSION"